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I. INTRODUCTION
To one who values federalism, federal preemption of state law may
significantly threaten the autonomy and core regulatory authority of
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states.' When an unelected federal agency official is the one
interpreting the unclear federal statute, the potential threat to state
autonomy may seem even greater. As the administrative state's
authority has increased, however, agencies administer a substantial
number of statutes that raise preemption issues, including statutes
bearing on health care, banking, communications, and the
environment, just to name a few. A statute may be unclear as to
whether it preempts state law at all, or else the statute may contain
language that expressly preempts state law, but the extent of that
preemption may remain unclear.
Courts deciding that a statute preempts state law have defined the
question largely as one of congressional intent.2 At least since Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,3 however, the Supreme Court has employed a
presumption that state powers are not lightly to be superseded.
Apparently motivated by a desire to protect state regulatory
prerogatives and sovereignty,4 the Court thus generally has required a
"clear statement" or other strong evidence of a "clear and manifest
1. A number of scholars have taken this view. E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 817-18 (1998) (noting that federal demands for
state or local services "at least preserve some role for [state] officials" while "preemption
eliminates their role entirely"); Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1349, 1384 (2001) (arguing that preemption threatens the core regulatory authority
of state governments, thereby undermining their ability to win popular loyalty necessary to
make political safeguards work); see also Adam Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New
Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000) (arguing that
"state dignity" may be reason for rule against commandeering). But see Viet Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000) (suggesting that in most cases,
despite preemption, state still retains essential functions); infra text accompanying notes 63-
64 (distinguishing among different kinds of preemption).
The scholarly focus on preemption as a threat to state autonomy contrasts with the
Supreme Court's recent emphasis on protecting states from the indignity of lawsuits. See,
e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(finding states immune from certain federal administrative adjudications and expressing
concern for "dignity that is consistent with [states'] status as sovereign entities"); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999): Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997)
("Constitution establishe[s] a system of 'dual sovereignty' " (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))). For a general discussion of the implications of the Court's
reliance on state "dignity," see Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, at 81, and Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye
Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
2. E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (" '[T]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992))). Some have argued that preemption questions should have
constitutional status. E.g., Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law:" Federal
Preemption and State Autonomy (Aug. 7, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
3. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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purpose of Congress" before holding state law preempted.5 On its own
terms, the Rice presumption would seem to apply to any interpretation
of a statute's preemptive effect, perhaps even where an administrative
agency has rendered the first interpretation.
Meanwhile, the doctrine of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council calls generally for judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations.6 Unless Congress has clearly answered the question at
hand, Chevron instructs a court to defer to the agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute it administers.7 The Chevron doctrine does
not expressly take account of state interests. Instead, Chevron
presumes that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority
to the agency because it is more expert and more politically
accountable than the courts. Given Chevron's application even to
"pure questions of law,"8 where one might expect courts to be the
experts, there might seem little reason to distinguish questions of state
law preemption.
When faced with an agency interpretation addressing a statute's
preemptive effect, courts have trod unevenly in reconciling Chevron
deference with the Rice presumption against preemption.9 Within a
single case, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., ° for example, the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that courts should resolve
de novo the threshold question whether a federal banking statute
preempted state law, notwithstanding a federal agency interpretation
5. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, quoted in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; see also Solid Waste
Assocs. of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001)
[hereinafter SWANCC Case] (seeking congressional "clear statement" that agency was
authorized to "invoke the outer limits" of congressional authority and commenting that
"[t]his concern [about the scope of agency interpretive authority] is heightened where the
administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power").
Although the presumption seems motivated by the Court's desire to protect state
regulatory prerogatives and sovereignty, even the Court's presumption against preemption
has been seen as inadequately protective of state interests by some members of Congress. To
further reduce judicial findings of federal statutory preemption, they introduced a bill known
as the Federalism Accountability Act. The bill was reported from committee in 1999 but was
never subject to a floor vote. See S. 1214, 106th Cong. (1999); S. REP. No. 106-159, at 1
(1999).
6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see infra
text accompanying notes 31-34 (discussing limits of Chevron).
7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
8. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (deferring to agency
interpretation on purely legal issue).
9. In theory, courts might try to preserve both doctrines, by applying the Rice
presumption at Step One of Chevron to conclude that Congress has directly addressed the
preemption question. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (arguing that courts have
generally not done so, and that in any event, such an approach would not relieve them of the
obligation of explaining why the Rice presumption should trump Chevron).
10. 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996).
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- but then paid Chevron deference to the agency interpretation of a
single word in the statute: "interest," despite arguments that the
agency interpretation effectively broadened the statute's preemption
of state law. Elsewhere, the Court, citing Chevron, has claimed to
accord "substantial weight" to an agency's interpretation of a statute
to preempt state law, but does not appear to have conducted the usual
Chevron inquiry." The lower appellate courts have wavered between
applying only Chevron12  and interpreting a statute de novo
notwithstanding an agency interpretation, following Rice.13
Some scholars have argued that granting Chevron deference to
agency interpretations regarding preemption is inappropriate because
important questions of state sovereignty would be resolved by
11. For example, in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469
U.S. 256, 262 (1985), and in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996), the Court
stated it would give "substantial deference" and "substantial weight," respectively, to an
Interior Department interpretation finding preempted a state law governing the distribution
of federal funds and to an FDA interpretation finding state common law claims preempted
by the federal Medical Devices Act. The Court also cited Chevron in Medtronic. 518 U.S. at
496. In both Lawrence County and Medtronic, however, the Court appeared to
independently assess the statute's meaning. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 262 (stating
Interior Department interpretation is "entitled to substantial deference, if it is a sensible
reading of the statutory language ... and if it is not inconsistent with the legislative history,
an inquiry that we now undertake" (citations omitted)); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496; id. at
505-06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (allowing the agency a "degree of leeway"); see also
Massachusetts Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1999) (characterizing
Medtronic as according "intermediate level of deference" to FDA interpretation). In Geier
v. American Honda, 529 U.S. 861 (2000), the Court stated that it would give "some weight"
to the view of the Department of Transportation (DOT) that state tort law would conflict
with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as implemented by DOT
regulations imposing passive restraint requirements on car manufacturers, id. at 883, but
then independently analyzed the statute and relevant regulations to find preemption. See id.
at 886 (finding state tort law to be an " 'obstacle' " to federal regulation even without giving
DOT's view "special weight").
Most recently, Justice Thomas suggested that given an agency interpretation that state
law did not present an obstacle to the goals of federal law, Chevron "imposes a perhaps-
insurmountable barrier to a claim of obstacle preemption." Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 681, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1877 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Obstacle pre-
emption's very premise is that Congress has not expressly displaced state law, and thus not
'directly spoken' to the pre-emption question.").
12. In Center for Legal Advocacy v. Hammons, 323 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2003), the court
applied Chevron in its review of an agency's interpretation of a federal statute's preemptive
effect upon a state law that barred patient advocates conducting an investigation from
obtaining access to peer-review records of a mental health facility. The court ultimately
rejected the agency interpretation as unreasonable and found the state law preempted. Id. at
1269 ("The statutory language cannot be reasonably construed [as the agency wishes to
construe it].").
13. For one example of many, in Massachusetts Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d
176 (1st Cir. 1999), despite the presence of an agency interpretation, the First Circuit
independently analyzed a federal Medicare statutory provision as precluding a state from
requiring each of its HMOs to offer at least one plan including full outpatient prescription
drug coverage. The court ultimately agreed with an agency determination that the
preemption clause of the Medicare + Choice Act did preempt the state law at hand.
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institutions that are not properly politically accountable. 4 Some
Justices have expressed similar reservations about agency
interpretations that "alter[] the federal-state framework,"'" or
suggested that "agencies are clearly not designed to represent the
interests of States."' 6 The contrast is with Congress, whose members
are elected from particular districts or states. The arguments founded
on political accountability concerns, however, have been largely
conclusory. They have included little in the way of detailed
comparisons of the institutional structure of agencies and of Congress
as they relate to the consideration of state interests.
This Article takes a more functional approach to reconciling
preemption doctrine with Chevron when Congress has not expressly
delegated preemptive authority to an agency, an approach that
considers a variety of concerns, including political accountability,
institutional competence, and related concerns. The Article assumes
that federalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority
and autonomy, are important and can be protected through political
processes." It argues that although Congress's "regional structure"
might hint at great sensitivity to state concerns, it actually may lead
Congress to undervalue some federalism benefits that are more
national in nature. Meanwhile, executive agencies generally have
significant incentives to take state concerns seriously. Agencies are
politically accountable through the President and also may wish to
maintain cooperative relationships with states.
Although the political accountability of agencies for considering
state interests is not significantly inferior to that of Congress, the
14. See, e.g., Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era,
59 U. PIr. L. REV. 805, 832 (1998) ("Unlike Congress, however, agencies are not designed
to represent the interests of states."); Damien Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron
Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 278 (1998) (arguing agencies
lack the political accountability "required by the Rice presumption and the rationales behind
it"); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons] (arguing that requirement that Congress, not
agencies, decide preemption questions is "an important requirement in light of the various
safeguards ... created by the system of state representation in Congress"). Some scholars
also have argued for deference to agency interpretations against preemption, but for no
deference where an agency's interpretation would lead to preemption. E.g., Howard P.
Walthall, Jr., Comment, Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassessment of Deference to
Administrative Preemption, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 715,754-58 (1997-98).
15. See SWANCC Case, 531 U.S. at 172 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971)) (majority opinion authored by Rehnquist, J.); see also Federalism: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 15 (1999) [hereinafter Senate Hearings
on Federalism] (statement of Gov. Thompson) ("I like dealing with you and I can usually
convince you to go part way with the position of the States, but once it leaves your hands
and goes over to a department, to some bureaucrat there that is going to promulgate the
rules, like they have in TANF, we are left out. We have no recourse whatsoever.").
16. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. For greater detail on these assumptions, see infra text accompanying notes 75-81.
March 2004]
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Article argues that Chevron deference to agency interpretations of the
preemptive effect of statutes is nonetheless inappropriate. An agency
may expertly assess the extent to which a particular state statute
interferes with the achievement of a federal goal. Other institutions,
however, may better assess issues such as the overall distribution of
governmental authority and the intrinsic value of preserving core state
regulatory authority. In addition to institutional competence concerns,
granting Chevron deference to agency preemption decisions may
result in inadequately constrained decisionmaking processes. Finally,
granting deference also might increase the risk that agencies would
inappropriately expand their own authority at the expense of the
states.
Instead, a preferable regime would not include Chevron deference.
A court should retain not only the ability to apply the Rice
presumption against preemption, but also the discretion to take
account of an agency interpretation on preemption under a regime
such as Skidmore v. Swift."s The court might do so when it views the
interpretation as possessing particular "power to persuade" in view of,
say, particular agency expertise.19
Reconciling the Rice presumption with Chevron has broader
implications for statutory interpretation. The presumption against
preemption is only one of a number of "value-based" or "substantive"
canons of statutory construction that potentially conflict with
Chevron.2" Meanwhile, by reserving interpretive questions to the
agencies with responsibility for administering the statute at hand, the
Chevron doctrine suggests an institutional, rather than a substantive,
solution to statutory ambiguity. Courts have yet to articulate a
consistent framework to reconcile substantive canons with Chevron,
leaving the status of the canons murky.21
Drawing in part on the reconciliation of the presumption against
preemption with Chevron, this Article takes issue with the position of
some scholars that courts should be able to use a substantive canon in
18. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 248-255.
20. E.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1049-50 (10th ed. 2002) (giving examples of such canons, including presumption against
extraterritorial application of statutes, tribal canon, and construction to avoid constitutional
question); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
277 (1994) (providing example of canon against extraterritorial application of statutes); id. at
294 (giving further example of canon to protect "interests of groups that had been
subordinated in the political process, including African Americans, women, native
Americans, noncitizens, and nonmarital children"); id. at 301 (listing canons such as "a
presumption against implied causes of action from federal statutes; a rule that federal
jurisdiction be narrowly construed, [and] a presumption against federal common law in an
area occupied by statute" (citations omitted)).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 37-59.
[Vol. 102:737
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preference to Chevron deference because the values of the canon are,
in some measure, "important."22 It argues for a more structured
framework to reconcile substantive canons with Chevron. Such a
structured framework should include examination of not only political
accountability, but also legal accountability, institutional competence,
and related concerns.
Part II presents some background on the rationales for both
Chevron and the presumption against preemption. Part III seeks to
offer a closer examination of political accountability - the issue on
which most scholars have focused - and concludes that agencies, like
Congress, may have significant incentives to take state interests into
account.23  Part III also considers questions of institutional
competence, legal accountability, and agency self-interest. Part III
concludes that Chevron deference is unwarranted, and attempts to
assess the weaknesses of the alternative approach. Finally, Part IV
concludes by considering the implications of this Article's framework
for the tension between Chevron and value-based canons of statutory
interpretation.
II. SOME BACKGROUND ON CHEVRON AND PREEMPTION
To better understand the stakes of a resolution of the tension
between Chevron deference and the presumption against preemption,
it is worth providing some additional background on each doctrine
and its underlying rationale.
A. Chevron and Value-Based Interpretive Canons
Under the familiar rule of Chevron, unless Congress has directly
answered the interpretive question at hand (as a court may conclude
in "Step One"), a court must defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute it administers (in Chevron "Step Two").24
Chevron seems best read as resting on the notion of an implicit
congressional delegation. The Chevron Court held that Congress can
be assumed to have delegated interpretive authority to agencies in
view of their superior policy expertise and political accountability
22. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra
note 14, at 338 (arguing that "nondelegation canons have the salutary function of ensuring
that certain important rights and interests will not be compromised unless Congress has
expressly decided to compromise them," though noting that content of such canons is open
to debate).
23. See infra Section III.A.2.
24. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 & n.29 (1987).
March 20041
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relative to the judiciary.2 Agencies are likely to have greater expertise
regarding the "force of the statutory policy," and so presumably are
able to "reconcil[e] conflicting policies" inherent in questions of the
"meaning or reach of a statute. ' 26 Moreover, so the argument goes,
these types of policy choices are more appropriately left to a politically
accountable branch (such as the executive branch, accountable via the
presidential election), rather than to unelected judges. 27 Consequently,
when a statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to the agency's
interpretation.
Although its antecedents were cases in which courts thought it best
to defer to expert agencies on mixed legal and factual questions, such
as whether a newsboy is an "employee" in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc. ,28 and whether waiting in a firehouse for the alarm
bell to ring is "working time" in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,29 Chevron
itself involved a question of law that implicated policy concerns (how
best to achieve certain environmental goals). The Supreme Court has
consistently indicated that the Chevron approach applies even to pure
questions of law, about which courts might appear to have a strong
claim of superior expertise.3"
Chevron does not completely eliminate the judicial role, of course.
A court may refuse Chevron deference, and answer an interpretive
question itself,3" if the agency has rendered its interpretation in an
unsuitable form. An interpretation in an agency opinion letter, for
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865; see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
740-41 (1996) (granting Chevron deference to agencies because of "presumption that
Congress... understood that [statutory] ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by
the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of
discretion the ambiguity allows"). The implicit delegation view of Chevron is the dominant,
but by no means the exclusive, view. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 670 (2000) (characterizing Chevron as based "partly on
the court's sense of what Congress would have wanted if it had thought about the issue and
partly on institutional considerations relating to separation of powers and democratic
accountability"); David Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative
Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 867-71 (2001) (discussing other justifications of Chevron and
noting that seeing Chevron as a judge-made rule, like a canon, would conflict with APA's
instruction, 5 U.S.C. § 706, that courts are to decide "all relevant questions of law").
26. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83
(1961)).
27. See id. at 865.
28. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
29. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
30. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
31. The court retains the discretion to draw on the administrative interpretation to the
extent it finds appropriate under the Skidmore doctrine. United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218,233 (2001).
[Vol. 102:737
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example, may be judged beyond the limits of the implicit delegation of
interpretive authority from Congress.32
Most relevant for our purposes, a court applying Chevron decides
in "Step One," using "traditional tools of statutory construction,"
whether Congress itself has clearly answered the interpretive question
presented. Step One includes considering the language of the relevant
provision, the language and design of the entire statute, and,
occasionally, legislative history.33 If the court finds that Congress
has clearly answered the question, the agency interpretation is beside
the point.34
Because of the large number of canons of construction predating
Chevron, courts have repeatedly had to reconcile Chevron with canons
ranging from "textual canons," including rules of syntax, to
substantive canons encoding some sort of value judgment. Despite
Chevron, for example, courts generally have applied rules of syntax in
preference to agency interpretations on the ground that the syntax
rules represent traditional tools of statutory construction by which
courts can discern whether Congress has directly answered a statutory
question under Chevron Step One.35
Reconciling "value-based" canons with Chevron has proven more
difficult. A court might reconcile such a substantive canon with
Chevron by folding it into the Step One inquiry, as it would a textual
32 Id. at 228 ("A very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment is
express congressional authorizations to engage in the rulemaking or adjudication process
that produces ... rulings for which deference is claimed."); see, e.g., Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (refusing deference to agency opinion letter). See generally
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25, at 836 (describing this aspect of doctrine as Chevron
"Step Zero").
33. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("traditional tools of statutory construction"); see
also, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (using language, legislative
history, and historical context); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1985) (using
"ordinary" textual canons to construe statute). As discussed infra note 37, substantive
canons generally are not - and should not be - incorporated into the Step One analysis.
See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511 (arguing that " 'traditional tools of statutory construction' " include "the
consideration of policy consequences").
34. As a number of scholars have noted, the increasing use of textualist approaches to
statutory interpretation to eke every bit of possible meaning out of a statutory text of course
renders Chevron less useful. E.g., Scalia, supra note 33, at 521 ("One who finds more often
(as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with
other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference
exists."); see also Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 780-784 (2002) (suggesting that courts' findings that statutes are
unclear under Step One, so that agency interpretation receives deference, largely depends
upon prudential considerations "such as judgments about the comparative qualifications of
courts and agencies").
35. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2100 (1990) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Law and Administration]. See generally John F. Manning,
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2486 n.285 (2003) (summarizing functions
of rules of syntax).
March 20041
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canon. In that case, the court might apply the canon, find the statute
unambiguous, and never proceed to considering the agency
interpretation. Such an approach, however, seems inappropriate.
Substantive presumptions or canons really represent a judicial
resolution of a statutory question where the evidence of what
Congress meant is unclear. As Daniel Halberstam has argued in the
context of the presumption against preemption, the presumption is
better understood as helping resolve a situation involving conflicting
evidence on statutory meaning.36 Consequently, such a presumption or
canon fits more naturally as an alternative to the entire Chevron
regime. Moreover, incorporating substantive canons into Step One
implies the survival of the Chevron doctrine. Chevron does not
actually survive this approach, however, because when it is taken, the
substantive canon will always dictate the result. Respect to Chevron
should oblige a court at least to explain why substantive canons should
prevail over an approach in which courts defer to agency
interpretations.
As a practical matter, courts generally have not applied substantive
canons at Chevron Step One to statutory language that is otherwise
ambiguous.37 Instead, they have chosen the alternative path - that of
considering substantive or value-based canons as alternatives to the
use of Chevron deference. Besides the presumption against
36. See Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems, A National
Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1061 (2001)
(presenting alternative views of presumption, ranging from evidentiary "tie-breaker" to
"systematic bias coloring the interpretation of... evidence" to view that "interpretations
suggesting Congress had the intent to preempt the States are disfavored whenever there are
other minimally plausible constructions of the evidence").
37. While the Supreme Court has not defined precisely what it means by "traditional
tools of statutory construction" applicable in Chevron Step One, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843 n.9, its cases suggest that rather than substantive canons, it is aiming at textual canons,
"which set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the drafter's choice of words, their
grammatical placement in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the 'whole'
statute." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 818
(3d ed. 2001); see, e.g., K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 290-95 (using language, legislative history, and
historical context); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 (using "ordinary" textual canons to
construe statute).
One Supreme Court opinion seems to be a notable exception, however. In INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001), the Court applied the presumption against retroactivity at
Step One of Chevron, stating, "Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to
retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously
prospective ... there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency
to resolve." St. Cyr could be explained as motivated by constitutional concerns, see infra
note 48. Further, it is in tension with the preemption cases discussed supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text.
Perhaps more to the point, however, respect for the Chevron doctrine should have
required the Court to more directly reconcile the presumption against retroactivity with
Chevron. Canons such as the presumption against retroactivity, unlike textual canons,
incorporate a value choice, so they are in tension with Chevron's rationale that the agency's
choice of values should inform the reading of an otherwise ambiguous statute.
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preemption, for example, courts have not adequately addressed
whether the so-called Indian canon - that an ambiguous statute
should be construed to favor Native American tribes - should trump
Chevron.
3 8
On the one hand, Chevron suggests as a general matter that
agencies, not courts, are to use their understanding of policies and
values to inform statutory interpretation in cases where statutory
language is unclear.39 And in interpreting statutes, agencies cannot
avoid facing value-laden legal and policy questions. This reasoning
might prompt a judge to abandon all value-based canons in favor of
Chevron whenever a case involves an agency interpretation.
On the other hand, the existence of a substantive canon, especially
one that is well established, may represent a judicial commitment to
some set of values.4" A number of scholars have argued judges are
competent to identify and incorporate public values into statutory
interpretation.4' The existence of the canon might also signify
something about congressional intention. For example, Congress
actually may have legislated against the backdrop of the canon at hand
or the canon might represent a reasonable set of assumptions about
what Congress might mean in passing statutory language, akin to the
syntactic canons courts use in Chevron Step One analysis.4" Finally,
substantive or value-based canons may be seen as a source of
3& See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Chevron to
trump Indian canon); Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (10th Cir.
1997) (rejecting Ninth Circuit approach); Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49,
58-59 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same). For other examples of value-based canons that may be in
tension with Chevron, see Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 334 (discussing
"nondelegation canons" inspired by "perceived public policy"); supra note 20 (citing
examples).
39. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (discussing agencies'
institutional advantages over courts).
40. Cf. Caminker, supra note 1 (arguing that judicial reliance on state "dignity" may
represent judicial effort to set new social norm); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note
14, at 334 ("The most sympathetic understanding of these canons rests on the view that the
relevant policies are not the judges' own, but have a source in widely held social
commitments.").
41. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 111 (1982);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1037,
1042 (1989).
42. See, e.g., F. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 228 (1975) (discussing interpretive rules as relating to probabilities of usage or
legislative behavior, including "descriptions of how legislatures tend to behave"). But see
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane Schachter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (suggesting that legislative drafters do not
systematically integrate judicial rules of construction into legislative drafting); cf. Dep't of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Reps., 525 U.S. 316, 342 (1999) (invoking avoidance canon,
given congressional silence on enacting "what would arguably be the single most significant
change in the method of conducting the decennial census since its inception"); Dinh, supra
note 1, at 2106 (considering presumption against preemption as connected to likelihood of
Congress's actual intent).
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continuity - as establishing a regime that generally guides the
understanding of citizens and legislators of particular statutes.43
Sunstein has suggested that a judicial choice to employ value-based
canons to construe otherwise unclear statutes, rather than deferring to
agency interpretations, might be understood as a sort of nondelegation
principle - a view that a particular result requires congressional,
rather than agency, deliberation." This means that the agency
decision, if contrary to the canon, will stand only if the decision's
proponents can navigate the institutional processes of Congress.45
According to Sunstein, these issues require congressional deliberation
because of Congress's "superior democratic pedigree. '46  That
argument has been explicit as well in the particular context of the
presumption against preemption.47
So which values are entitled to democratically superior
congressional deliberation? Outside of constitutional interpretation
questions, 48 Sunstein has suggested, at least descriptively, that value-
43. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921, 927 (1992) (describing canons that "aid in reading statutes against the entire
background of existing customs, practices, rights, and obligations... [and] that emphasize
the importance of not changing existing understandings any more than is needed to
implement the statutory objective").
44. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 35, at 677. But see David M. Driesen,
Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PIrF. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
45. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 339 (2000) ("Certain
controversial or unusual actions will occur only with respect for the institutional safeguards
introduced through the design of Congress."); id. at 335 (arguing that nondelegation canons
should be understood as way of ensuring "that judgments are made by the democratically
preferable institution"); see also Campbell, supra note 14, at 832 (arguing that administrative
preemption is in tension with presumption against preemption because agencies can more
easily make law than Congress).
46. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 317.
47. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
48. "Constitutional" canons such as the rule of lenity are beyond the scope of this
Article. It is worth noting, however, that the Court has generally declined to defer under
Chevron where the agency interpretation would conflict with such a canon. See generally
Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 35. The Court has also found agency rules that
would present a court with a constitutional question to be unauthorized unless Congress
clearly authorized the agency to issue the rule (the "avoidance" canon). E.g., SWANCC
Case, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (finding agency interpretation unauthorized because it raised
significant constitutional issue and stating, "Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result."); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25 (arguing that avoidance
canon would enlarge scope of agency policymaking by presenting court with constitutional
questions). See generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71. The basis for
the "avoidance" canon is unclear; it might be seen as part of a strategy to minimize judicial
intrusion into the majoritarian legislative process. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (noting "prudential
concern" that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted"); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
& Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
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based canons require such deliberation and therefore trump Chevron
when they represent "important" values. 49 The presumption against
preemption might be one such canon. 0
This approach, however, is normatively unsatisfying.5 In the first
place, saying that a value is "important" does not help resolve the
question whether ambiguous statutory provisions implicating the value
should be interpreted in the first instance by courts, using the canon,
or by agencies." The thrust of Chevron, of course, is that agencies
have superior political accountability and technical policy expertise,
relative to courts, in deciding value-laden policy questions. Even with
regard to detecting congressional preferences, agencies may have
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 632 (1992) (noting theorized consequences from
"Court's concern about the countermajoritarian difficulties in striking down statutes enacted
by popularly elected legislatures"). But see Schauer, supra, at 74 ("[I]t is by no means clear
that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any
less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less
strained interpretation of the same statute."). Alternatively, the avoidance canon could be
justified by assuming that Congress is sensitive to constitutional concerns. Congress would
thus hesitate to pass an unconstitutional statute and would avoid presenting the Court with
constitutional questions. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575; Eskridge, supra note 41,
at 1018-20. Finally, however, a court's decision not to defer to an agency's statutory
interpretation that raises constitutional concerns could be justified based on an assumption
that agencies lack competence on constitutional questions. E.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115
F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) ("When agencies adopt a constitutionally troubling
interpretation, however, we can be confident that they not only lacked the expertise to
evaluate the constitutional problems, but probably didn't consider them at all.").
49. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 338.
50. Although state law preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, no constitutional
source has been offered for the presumption against preemption. This fact has led Caleb
Nelson to argue for abandoning the presumption itself. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REV. 225 (2000); see also Dinh, supra note 1, at 2092, 2094 (arguing that the
preemption question is statutory, not constitutional, in nature). But see Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 331 (arguing that presumption against preemption
has foundation in constitutional structure).
51. Apart from the sources cited supra note 45, scholars have offered relatively few
normative arguments to resolve the tension between Chevron and the value-based canons.
An important exception is Bradley's argument that Chevron deference should be afforded to
agency analyses of treaty obligations. See Bradley, supra note 25.
52. For example, take two alternative explanations for the canon favoring Indian tribes,
each offered by Sunstein: first, that the canon is designed to require clear congressional
action before a statute will be construed against a "group that has been mistreated in the
past," see Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 35, at 2115, or second, that it grows
out of the "complex history of relations" between tribes and the United States. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 333. Both assertions seem to support only the
argument that tribal relations make the positive treatment of tribes an important value;
neither helps resolve the question whether ambiguous statutory provisions raising tribal
issues should be decided by courts or agencies. Nor do they provide any principled basis for,
say, selecting other value-based canons that might trump Chevron. See also RODERICK M.
HILLS, JR., AGAINST PREEMPTION: How FEDERALISM CAN IMPROVE THE NATIONAL
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3 (Univ. of Mich. Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
27, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ. Discussion, Paper No. 2003-007,
2003) (arguing that the "notion that federalism is an important value" is "too general to
bake any legal bread").
HeinOnline  -- 102 Mich. L. Rev. 749 2003-2004
Michigan Law Review
some advantages over courts, as they are often involved in the process
of drafting new legislation.13
Nor does it fully resolve normative difficulties to argue that the
canon is somehow neutral and that Congress, rather than the judiciary,
will be the sole decisionmaker on the value-laden question. This
argument relies on an assumption that Congress's democratic
credentials are clearly superior to those of the agencies, and the
question thus would be resolved by the decisionmaker with superior
democratic credentials.
This argument has two problems. First, judicial values are likely to
intrude. Judicial use of an interpretive canon does not simply return a
question to Congress. Instead, the default answer is supplied by the
court, rather than an agency, and the burden is on Congress to reverse
it.54 Rather than functioning neutrally, each canon incorporates a value
judgment in the sense of raising the agency's cost of a decision
contrary to the default result under the canon.5 To the extent the
canon is informed by the judiciary's choice of values or assessment of
publicly held values, it is in tension with the goal of having the value
resolved by a relatively democratic institution.
A canon could conceivably be seen as dictated by the need for
some background rule against which Congress is to legislate. 6 In that
case, the selection of the default rule might be seen as somewhat less
troubling, closer to a rule of syntax, and hence more "neutral."57 That
53. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233, 284, 288 (1990) (noting that agencies are in regular communication with Congress);
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272 (1987) (same).
54. Sunstein argues that these "nondelegation canons" are less intrusive than the use of
the nondelegation doctrine because as long as Congress is specific, it is not barred from
legislating. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 335 (arguing that such canons
are "a species of judicial minimalism"). But the nondelegation doctrine, though it completely
invalidates a particular statutory provision, does not bar Congress from legislating, as long as
Congress supplies an "intelligible principle." From the standpoint of whether corrective
legislative action can be obtained at all, it is simply unclear whether Congress faces more
obstacles in responding to a judicial decision striking down a statutory provision on
nondelegation grounds or in correcting a judicial interpretation in reliance on a
nondelegation canon.
Moreover, Mashaw has argued strongly that even if a legislature may be able to overturn
an erroneous interpretation, that interpretation will affect the legislature's ability to reinstate
its original goal. Because interpretation "rearrange[s] the status quo," "it is most unlikely
that [the legislature] will ever be able to reverse an interpretation such that it reinstates the
precise policy that was adopted originally." See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 103 (1997).
55. As Sunstein has acknowledged, the content of the canons that might be applied
notwithstanding a contrary agency interpretation is properly open to debate. See Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 341.
56. E.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 276-77 (arguing for efficiency of canons because
of difficulty of drafting complete statutes that cover all contingencies).
57. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 335-36 (noting that such
canons erect "decisive barrier" to resolution of issue by executive institution). It also might
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leads to the second problem, however. Even assuming canons are
somehow "neutral" and merely return a value-laden question to
Congress, Congress may not always have a clear advantage
over agencies in terms of political responsiveness or political
accountability. While political accountability is surely relevant under a
Chevron-based framework, it seems inadequate to argue that
Congress is always more "politically accountable" than an agency
because its members are directly elected. Political accountabili-
ty and responsiveness are discussed from a more functional
perspective below. 8
Finally, allowing value-based canons regularly to trump Chevron,
without a reasoned approach to when or whether this should occur,
would reduce the predictability of the legal regime for litigants.
Similarly, as Congress drafts new statutes, it would not know whether
ambiguous statutory language might be interpreted by a court
applying a substantive canon or by an agency. 9 Accordingly,
proponents of the value-based canons are under an obligation to
explain why particular canons should trump Chevron. At the same
time, the canons signal some judicial or congressional commitment to
the values they embody. Rather than dismiss the canon out of hand,
that commitment suggests that we should carefully consider whether
the canon should survive Chevron.
Consistent with retaining Chevron, a reconciliation of a value-
based canon with Chevron should go beyond asking the question
whether the value is "important." At a minimum, such a reconciliation
should attempt to respect the concerns motivating Chevron. In
be argued that a canon represents a judicial "detection" of congressional preferences. See,
e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 167 ("[Jludicial preferences concerning the best statutory
policy are heavily conditioned by examination of the legislative deliberations leading up to
the statute's enactment."). At best, determining congressional preferences without the
guidepost of statutory language seems challenging. At worst, judges may be tempted to
consult their own assessments of public values.
58. See infra Section III.A.
59. E.g., Scalia, supra note 33, at 516-17 (arguing that under Chevron approach,
Congress knows that its ambiguities will be resolved by particular agency). As discussed
below, a canon-by-canon approach to determining whether a value-based canon trumps
Chevron arguably increases unpredictability for litigants relative to a scheme of either pure
Chevron or pure canons. But a clear framework that guides such an approach would be
preferable both to an ad hoc approach that chooses between Chevron and a canon on a case-
by-case basis and to an approach based on the "importance" of the value at stake.
This analysis assumes that the use of canons increases predictability for Congress, an
assumption that is obviously not shared by all. For example, Karl Llewellyn famously argued
that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point." Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). On the other hand, William Eskridge and
Philip Frickey's collection of canons used by the Rehnquist Court suggests that even if this
proposition were completely accepted, not all canons would be in equal use. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-108 (1994).
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addition to political accountability, such a reconciliation thus should
also include institutional concerns. More specifically, a reconciliation
should assess an institution's expertise in a particular interpretive task
and its legal accountability for rendering the interpretation. The
analysis might also include assessing the incentives facing and possible
responses of other institutions. For example, would a particular
approach raise decision costs because of greater uncertainty, or give a
particular institution unbridled discretion? An approach that depends
more directly upon relative institutional competence on the issues at
hand, as well as the agency's relative political and legal accountability
for the relevant decisions, would be a more thorough one. It would
also be more faithful to the concerns justifying Chevron.6
B. The Presumption Against Preemption
I now turn briefly to the preemption doctrine, including its
application to agency actions. Assuming Congress is exercising its
enumerated powers, there is no constitutional obstacle to preemption.
The Supremacy Clause entitles Congress "to preempt state law if it
chooses."'" Influenced by concerns about state sovereignty and state
regulatory prerogatives, however, the Supreme Court has in this
century generally applied a presumption against preemption, requiring
a "clear statement" or its equivalent from Congress before being
willing to conclude that a federal statute preempts state law.62
Statutory preemption breaks down into a few basic categories, any
of which might be implicated by an agency interpretation. It includes
express preemption, where Congress has explicitly stated its intention
to preempt state law. Preemption also subsumes implied preemption,
where Congress's intent to preempt may be inferred from the conflict
of federal and state law (such that compliance with both is a physical
impossibility) or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the full
60. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885, 927 (2003) (arguing that "institutional arguments" are best way to assess
Chevron questions).
61. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 331. But see ESKRIDGE, supra
note 20, at 285 (listing presumption against preemption among "constitutionally based
canons"); Stephen Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994)
(arguing in general that power of preemption does not stem from Supremacy Clause).
62. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1023-25 (describing preemption doctrine and
arguing that canon may be justified by relative institutional competence or to protect local
values from "inadvertent federal interference"). But see, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (declining to apply presumption against preemption
to a claim regarding fraudulent misrepresentation to federal agency, on ground that issues
raised did not "implicat[e] 'federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation
of matters of health and safety' " (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996))); Nelson, supra note 50, at 230 n.19 (2000) (noting sources arguing that Court has not
consistently applied presumption).
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accomplishment of Congress's goals and purposes,63 and field
preemption, where one may infer from the breadth and depth of
federal regulation that Congress meant to occupy the field and
preempt the states from regulating in that area.64
By applying a presumption against preemption, courts effectively
make congressional deliberation a prerequisite to preemption. That
reduces the likelihood of legislation preempting state law. Partly this is
simply because new legislation is difficult to enact. A clear statement
rule puts the burden on groups seeking legislative preemption to place
the issue on the congressional agenda and obtain passage.65 Further,
with a clear statement rule, a state (or other interested group) is more
likely to receive notice before the fact of a possible legislative decision
that could negatively affect the scope of state lawmaking, giving it a
greater opportunity to express its views.
1. Agency Actions and Preemption
How might an agency affect the scope of federal preemption of
state law? An agency might interpret the statute to communicate a
congressional intent to preempt state law or to "occupy the field." It
also might read the statute as communicating goals to which a state
statute might present an obstacle. Finally, the agency might interpret
the scope of an express preemption clause to, say, preempt state
statutory law but not state tort law. The relevant agency
interpretations are those eligible for Chevron deference - hence
those reached in a rulemaking or formal adjudication.66
This Article will not, however, discuss another form of preemption
that involves agencies, so-called regulatory preemption. For example,
to the extent an agency regulation is appropriately authorized and
issued, it preempts directly conflicting state law, on the theory that
63. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000) (noting in
context of assessing statutory savings clause that both " 'obstacle' " and impossibility cases
are forms of "conflict" with state law that Congress would not have wanted to tolerate
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
64. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (describing "field preemption" and "conflict" preemption
as forms of implied preemption).
65. Rick Hills argues in support of the clear statement rule for this reason, on the
ground that the interest groups that would support preemption are better organized.
Consequently an incorrect judicial ruling under the clear statement rule is more likely to
evoke vigorous debate and correction in the legislature than an incorrect ruling made under
a different rule. See HILLS, supra note 52. But see Dinh, supra note 1 (arguing that clear
statement rule is simply a method of detecting likely congressional preferences).
66. Although United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), refused deference to an
interpretation rendered in an informal adjudication, the unusual circumstances of that case
suggest that some interpretations rendered in informal adjudications may still be eligible for
deference. See id. at 233 ("Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are
being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency's 46 scattered offices is simply self-
refuting.").
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Congress would want its agency's decision to be effective.67 Also
beyond the scope of this paper is how a court should review other
agency decisions to preempt state law when Congress has already
delegated the agency preemptive authority.' This sort of preemption
67. It is now widely agreed that where a validly issued administrative rule directly
conflicts with state law (i.e., compliance with both is a physical impossibility), the Supremacy
Clause requires the agency rule to take precedence. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
382 (1961); see also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982). See,
e.g., Paul A. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 866 (1995) (arguing that rulings may
best be justified by seeing Congress's delegation of administrative authority as "intending
preemption of state law directly conflicting with agency regulations"). As a general matter,
assuming the agency was exercising properly delegated authority, Congress would have
wanted the agency's decision to be effective and to control. Benjamin Heineman & Carter
Phillips, Federal Preemption: A Comment on Regulatory Preemption After Hillsborough
County, 18 URB. LAW. No. 3, at 589, 592 (Summer 1986); see, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S.
at 485.
Language in some Supreme Court cases decided after Shimer suggested that an express
regulatory statement by an agency would suffice to preempt state law, even without a
specific delegation of preemptive authority by Congress. See City of New York v. FCC, 486
U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (stating that beyond conflict preemption, "in proper circumstances the
agency may determine that its authority is exclusive"); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691 (1984); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154 (stating that relevant question is whether
"Board meant to pre-empt" state law). The language in these cases could imply that
Congress "intend[ed] to include [the power to preempt] along with a general grant of
discretionary authority." Walthall, supra note 14, at 732; see also, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (stating that agency may preempt state law if
"acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority"). But cf Blum v. Bacon,
457 U.S. 132, 140 n.8 (1982) (in finding federal regulation preemptive of state law, noting
" 'broad rule-making powers' " of agency (quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 277
n.28 (1969))). On the other hand, both Crisp and de la Cuesta involved direct conflicts, and
in City of New York, the Court found evidence of congressional approval in a later-passed
statute. See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 66; Crisp, 467 U.S. at 698; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at
158 n.13, 158 n.14 (noting directness of conflict). Another reading of these cases might be
that an agency statement of intent to preempt is necessary, though not sufficient, to preempt,
so that absent such a direct statement, even an agency regulation in conflict with state law
would not be read to preempt state law. But cf. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381 & n.8 (finding
preemption without statement from agency of intent to preempt). Ultimately, in Geier, the
Supreme Court made clear that at least in the context of conflict between a federal
regulation and state law, the critical issue was whether a duly authorized regulation actually
conflicted with state law, rather than whether the agency made a statement indicating intent
to preempt state law. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (noting that statement of intent to preempt
was not a prerequisite to preemption).
Whether an agency's express statement that it (as opposed to Congress) seeks to
preempt state law is sufficient to preempt without a direct conflict with state law is beyond
the scope of this paper, though the analysis presented here would suggest that a prerequisite
to such a holding should be a congressional delegation that specifically includes the authority
to preempt. See, e.g., City of New York, 486 U.S. at 66 (finding congressional affirmation of
FCC assertion of authority to preempt in Congress's enactment of 1984 Cable Act "against a
background of federal pre-emption on this particular issue").
68. For example, City of New York v. FCC concerned the FCC's preemption of state
and local technical standards governing the quality of cable television signals, even though
there was no direct conflict between state and federal rules. The court approved it in light of
Congress's ratification of the FCC's authority in a later statute, "act[ing] against a
background of federal preemption on this particular issue." 486 U.S. at 66. There is some
uncertainty in the case law regarding just how far agency power of this type extends. See,
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by agencies is seen as "backed up by a congressional grant of authority
to do so," unlike Chevron's implicit delegation of authority.69 It raises
distinct concerns regarding the nature, scope, and application of the
authority received by the agency.7° With respect to these types of
actions, courts apply no presumption against preemption, but assess
only whether the agency was exercising properly delegated authority.
2. The Concerns of Preemption Doctrine
Preemption questions may incorporate both issues of how best to
implement a federal statute and what might be termed "federalism
values." So-called obstacle preemption analysis, for example, raises
the question whether a state law interferes with the accomplishment of
federal purposes, an assessment that could be fairly technical in
nature. The preemption question, at least currently, also incorporates
a general concern with the appropriate balance of power between the
federal and state governments and with maintaining core attributes of
state sovereignty.
The presumption against preemption, as exemplified by
Hillsborough and Rice, could be justified by the theory that it reflects
the probable assumption of the median legislator,7" or that the canon is
arguably "democracy-enhancing" by encouraging congressional
debate on preemption.72 More likely, the canon represents a
reluctance to risk incidental statutory interference with federalism
values and with state sovereignty.73 In part, courts could be reluc-
tant to assume that Congress has made a conscious decision that
particular state laws should be preempted to best implement federal
statutory goals.
e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) (discussing
reluctance to infer field preemption from authorized agency activity); Walthall, supra note
14, at 731-32 (discussing three possible views of scope of delegation).
69. Walthall, supra note 14, at 758; see also id. ("These cases, unlike Chevron, are based
on actual congressional delegations of authority.").
70. For example, the Supreme Court analyzed these questions as distinct in New York v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002), saying that it would analyze the
regulatory preemption questions "without any presumption one way or the other." See also
id. (distinguishing between cases raising " 'presumption against preemption' " and those not
implicating the presumption, in which Congress may have directly authorized agency to
preempt state law).
71. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 279; Dinh, supra note 1.
72. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 286 (describing theory under which canons
such as presumption against preemption are arguably democracy-enhancing); HILLS, supra
note 52, at 18-21 (arguing based on assumptions regarding interest group configuration and
entrepreneurial activity of nonfederal lawmakers that anti-preemption presumption is more
likely to create dialogue than pro-preemption presumption).
73. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1024-25 (describing "meta-rule" of avoiding
preemption of traditional state functions as motivated by desire "to protect important local
values from inadvertent federal interference").
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The presumption, however, appears to be based on more than
either an assumption regarding the median legislator's preferences or
an assumption that Congress thought only in general terms about
implementation. Instead, courts appear to be attaching substantive
value to federalism goals (or doing their own detection of "public
values"). The Medtronic Court, for example, described potential
federal preemption of state common law remedies as a "serious
intrusion into state sovereignty." '74
Although there is a significant debate on the benefits of
federalism,75 its advocates typically articulate the following set of
advantages. Very briefly stated, federalism may be seen as favoring
government responsiveness and stimulating citizen participation in
self-governance, since citizens are presumed to be able to participate
more directly in policymaking at the state level. State regulation also
may be more efficient than federal, in the sense that policies
developed at the state level may be more responsive to regional
variability in preferences compared with nationally uniform policies,
and states may have the incentive to compete for citizens, who have
the choice to move elsewhere.76 Moreover, state involvement in
policymaking can facilitate numerous policy "laboratories" that can
develop and test a variety of policies, to the ultimate benefit of all.77
74. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996). Similarly, in Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), a "fraud-on-the-FDA" case in which the
Court found no presumption against preemption of state law, it grounded its decision on its
view that "[plolicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.' " Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
75. For a recent argument that federalism fails to serve its articulated values, see Frank
Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that "federalist"
values are really values of localism). See also Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 907 (1994)
("[F]ederalism in America achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims
for it").
76. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing federalism benefits);
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers:" In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774 (1995); Caminker, supra note 1, at 89
(discussing "structural values" of federalism); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) [hereinafter
Kramer, Putting Politics Back] (arguing that the best reason to care about federalism is
"because preferences for governmental policy are unevenly distributed among the states and
regions of the nation, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking"). But
see E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 330-31 (1985) (arguing state regulation is
often inefficient because its effects can be externalized to other states).
77. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing states as "laborator[ies]"); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political
Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 KAN. L. REV.
1113 (1997); see also HILLS, supra note 52, at 18, 20-21 (arguing that state regulators may
motivate business and industry groups to place issues on federal agenda, thereby generating
"vigorous congressional debate").
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Finally, some argue that protecting state authority as a counterbalance
to federal authority was part of the Framers' scheme of separation of
powers, "the division, dispersion, and assignment of power to various
entities."78
While there is, similarly, a debate on how federalism values can be
best protected, the Court and a significant group of scholars have
argued that federalism values can be adequately protected by
"political safeguards."79 The argument is that national political
structures such as political parties and participation opportunities in
the national political process afford states the ability to ensure that the
state role and state autonomy receive thorough consideration. 80
Rather than focusing upon whether federalism values are
normatively justified, I wish to take as a given the Court's arguments
on federalism's behalf and then to proceed to assessing whether it
makes sense to defer presumptively, under Chevron, to administrative
agency decisions on state law preemption. I thus take as a given that
federalism supports the values described above; that the Court is
appropriately attaching importance to protecting federalism, both
generally and in the context of preemption; and finally, that federalism
can be appropriately protected through "political safeguards."81
78. See Caminker, supra note 1, at 89 (noting argument that existence of states serves as
check against "Congress [either asserting] power that does not lawfully belong to it or
wield[ing its power] too frequently or indiscriminately"); Marci A. Hamilton, The Elusive
Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 95 (Mar. 2001)
("From the Framers' perspective, the nature of the constitutional division of power between
the federal government and the states is not different from the divisions between the federal
branches....").
79. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Kramer,
Putting Politics Back, supra note 76; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Although it has never expressly questioned its
commitment to "political safeguards," the Court's jurisprudence is not completely
consistent. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 288 (arguing that use of super-strong clear
statement rules seems in tension with Garcia "unless the Court has second thoughts about
how well protected state and local governments are at the federal level"); Jenna Bednar &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1995) ("Does Garcia, which
reasons that federalism limits on Congress are best enforced by the political process, survive
the Court's decision in Lopez, which insists that the Court remain as a monitor of
congressional power?"). Even the presumption against preemption seems somewhat
inconsistent with the idea that protection of state interests should be left completely to the
political process.
80. As to this as well, there is a significant debate. Cross and Hamilton both argue that if
federalism is to be protected, political safeguards are inadequate. See Cross, supra note 75, at
8-12; Hamilton, supra note 78, at 94 ("Their trust in the invisible hand of politics is
misplaced."). Baker and Young also argue that rather than supporting state autonomy, some
states may support the use of federal authority in order to gain advantages over other states.
See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001).
81. Even if federalism could be adequately protected through political safeguards, the
safeguards would not eliminate disputes in the courts about the meaning of an ambiguous
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Assuming for the moment that judicial values play no part, we
might see the presumption against preemption as a background rule
incorporating an assumption about congressional intent - that the
median legislator might generally prefer that state law not be
preempted. However, the Chevron doctrine too is based on
assumptions regarding likely congressional preferences - that
Congress would prefer the agencies to resolve interpretive ambiguities
in statutes they administer. 2 The next section attempts to resolve this
conflict.
III. AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE ON PREEMPTION QUESTIONS
Despite Chevron, considerations of political accountability and
institutional expertise, as well as legal accountability, suggest that an
agency's interpretation of federal law to preempt state law generally
should not be presumptively entitled to deference.83 This conclusion
does not, however, rest on the reason suggested by some scholars -
that agency political accountability for considering state interests is
inadequate. 4 As discussed in greater detail below, the political
accountability of agencies for considering the interests of states does
not seem clearly inferior to that of Congress. After looking at political
accountability, this Section then considers agency expertise, self-
interest, and the prospect of increased arbitrariness in decisionmaking,
and concludes that all weigh against an across-the-board presumption
of deference to the agency interpretation.
Before continuing with the analysis, it is worth noting that much of
the literature assessing the value of federalism and the extent to which
"political safeguards" can protect federalism depends on claims of an
empirical nature. As a general matter, however, not much evidence
has been presented in support of these claims. Some evidence also
may be difficult to collect in a reliable form. For example, while it may
statute, though courts might apply a different decision rule. The presence of "adequate"
political safeguards does not guarantee that a state will always win a legislative battle, for
example, and losers in the political process may wish to attempt to invoke judicial
intervention, even with only a small chance of victory.
82. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Interpretations in guidance documents,
informal letters, and the like are ineligible for Chevron deference, following Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Whether an interpretation in an informal adjudication is
generally eligible for Chevron deference may still be in dispute after United States v. Mead.
See supra note 66.
83. Of course, there is always the possibility that what Congress actually wants is to
leave a question ambiguous, permit an agency to resolve it, and thereby escape the political
costs that might accompany passing a preemptive statutory provision. See, e.g., Campbell,
supra note 14, at 829 ("[P]olitical sidestepping is precisely the type of congressional behavior
that post-Garcia federalism jurisprudence seeks to prevent").
84. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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be easy to document the frequency with which state officials or
representatives of state organizations testify before Congress, proving
that Congress actually considers state interests is difficult because of
the absence of readily available evidence on less formal participation
and of a baseline against which to measure enacted statutes.
Nonetheless, I attempt in this Article to take some concrete steps
toward assembling available evidence and to identify further evidence
that, if gathered, would be relevant to the inquiry.
A. Political Safeguards for States in Congress and the Agencies
Consider political accountability under the view of the
presumption against preemption that the presumption represents a
judicial choice of values. Because agencies are politically accountable
through the President, however, and federal judges are not elected,
agencies would seem to be more politically accountable than courts.5
Certainly that is the reasoning of Chevron.6
On the other hand, suppose the presumption against preemption is
seen as a method of ensuring that Congress itself makes the
preemption decision. On this view, the presumption against
preemption might be characterized as more neutral and dictated not
so much by judicial values as by the need to have some background
rule against which Congress can legislate. In that case, comparing
agency political accountability with that of courts is insufficient.
Instead, agency political accountability must be compared with that of
Congress.
Turning to Congress, the political safeguards theory referenced
above provides some content to "political accountability" by
suggesting that federalism values are protected if they are fully
expressed and adequately considered in the legislative process.
Although scholars have sometimes argued about the extent of
federalism's protection in Congress based on the outcomes of votes on
individual bills, 7 it cannot be that federalism advocates must win every
85. See MASHAW, supra note 54, at 153.
86. See supra text accompanying note 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-43
(discussing defenses of courts as detectors of public values).
87. Some have argued that as a general matter, members of Congress raise federalism
concerns only when it is convenient, and are not generally driven to do so either by voters or
organizations. E.g., Interview with Lynn Rivers, former U.S. Representative, in Ann Arbor,
Mich. (Apr. 16, 2003). As others have noted, despite encroachments on traditional areas of
state regulation, Congress has regulated state laws impinging on religious freedom
(Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), elementary and secondary education (No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C.)) and has attempted to regulate third-trimester abortion, see Hamilton, supra
note 78, at 99-100. If so, then perhaps we should see states as ineffective advocates in the
legislative process. On the other hand, Congress also has passed important legislation
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vote in Congress to show that such values have been adequately
considered. That would imply that Congress must always do what
states want. If inferences regarding political safeguards are to be
drawn from legislative outcomes, those outcomes must be measured
against the outcomes of a baseline legislative process, a process in
which state groups have some measurably different involvement.
In the absence of reliable outcome-based evidence for or against
political safeguards, it makes sense at least to examine the
decisionmakers' incentives to thoroughly consider state interests, their
processes for doing so, as well as the ability of states and aligned
interest groups to participate in and to present information in the
decisionmaking process, issues I discuss in greater detail below.' The
extent to which "political safeguards" in Congress adequately protect
state interests has been the subject of extensive debate. My concern in
the following Section, however, is primarily comparative: how do
political safeguards for state participation in the administrative
process compare with those supplied by the federal legislative
process?
1. Political Safeguards for States in Congress
In this Section, I will begin by sketching the current debate over
representation of state interests in Congress and then turn to assessing
Congress's incentives to consider arguments for state autonomy.
Scholars are generally agreed that prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment's adoption in 1913, state legislatures had direct influence
in Congress because they selected Senators, though whether that
influence served any useful end is unclear.89 After 1913, in any event,
protecting state interests, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); it has also given serious
consideration to the Federalism Accountability Act. See supra note 5 (discussing Act's
consideration in full committee); see also George A. Bermann, Regulatory Federalism:
European Union and the United States, in 263 RECUEIL DES COURS 48, 94-95 (Academy of
International Law 1997) (discussing Unfunded Mandates Reform Act). Further, Carol Lee
has described examples where states have both succeeded and failed in obtaining
congressional intervention following an adverse judicial decision. See Carol F. Lee, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 20 URB. LAW. 301, 337 (1988). But without any baseline
against which to measure legislative outcomes, the extent to which states, state associations,
and allied interest groups can be seen as "effective" in obtaining legislative results raises a
possibly intractable empirical question.
88. E.g., Kramer, Putting Politics Back, supra note 76. Hills focuses not on the
participation of state groups in the preemption context, but on aligned interest groups.
HILLS, supra note 52, at 18-19.
89. See Kramer, Putting Politics Back, supra note 76, at 224 n.33 (arguing that "contrary
to popular belief, the power of state legislators to select Senators had lost most of its
significance for federalism long before adoption of the 17th Amendment in 1913").
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state legislatures were "cut out of the electoral loop."9 Nonetheless,
some scholars have argued that a variety of substitute means ensure
that Congress is highly motivated to consider state interests.
Wechsler and others, for example, have argued that even without
the Seventeenth Amendment the regional nature of congressional
elections is sufficient to supply members of Congress with a strong
incentive to represent state interests in congressional deliberations.9'
On this view, individual voters serve as the intermediary for the
interests of states. One reason might be that voters' substantive
concerns, regional in nature, overlap with those of their state
government. For example, the positions of federal lawmakers in the
debate over the future of electric power following the large
Northeastern and Midwestern power blackouts of August 2003 look
likely to follow regional lines, serving the interests of both states and
of voters within those states.92 Voters may also prefer governance by
their state rather than by the federal government, though polling data
on this score are inconclusive at best. For example, polled voters have
given essentially equivalent "grades" to the performance of federal,
state, and local governments. 93 Finally, it might be because state
governments persuade voters to carry their water at the polls, though
how this might be empirically proven is unclear. Young, for example,
has argued that state governments will attempt to mobilize their
citizens to express governmental concerns, such as the desire to
preserve core regulatory authority, at the polls.94
90. Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1349 (1996).
91. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 79; see also, e.g., Bermann, supra note 87, at 53 ("The
most obvious candidate [for representing the interests of the States and "championing" the
principles of federalism] is the Congress, whose members are elected by territorial units and
may therefore be expected to show sensitivity to the interests of States and local
governments and to the values of federalism."); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the
Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1202 (2001) ("Because representation in Congress is
state-based, state constituencies have a voice in Congress through their elected federal
representatives, whom the voters may remove from office if they fail adequately to respect
state prerogatives.").
92. See Carl Hulse, Congress Prepares for a Beyond-the-Beltway Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2003, at A16.
93. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANGING
PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 24-26 (1990) (essentially equivalent
"grades" given to performance of federal, state, and local governments). Young has argued
that an essential core of state authority must be protected so that states can compete for the
affection of voters. See Young, supra note 1. Pettys has argued that the increase in federal
authority can be understood as the federal government winning a "vertical competition for
the people's affection" with state governments. Todd Pettys, Competing for the People's
Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329,333 (2003).
94. See Young, supra note 1, at 1356 (arguing that some advantages, such as the core
regulatory authority of state government, are likely to be valued more by the government
itself than by voters, although arguing that states will mobilize their citizens to express state-
government-related views at the polls).
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Besides voters, state organizations also transmit the interests of
states to members of Congress. As a general matter, state
organizations seem well-positioned to have their voices heard in
legislative decisionmaking. The "Big Seven" - the state interest
groups, including such organizations as the National Governors'
Association, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the
National Conference of State Legislatures - are well organized and
have overcome the usual free-rider-type obstacles that usually impede
interest groups from presenting their views in the legislative process.95
Along with state governors and other state and local officials, these
organizations regularly testify before Congress (although some
scholars have complained that state organizations are not always
invited to testify).96
In doing so, state organizations have expressly supported the more
abstract values of federalism. For example, the head of the Council of
State Governments, one of the "Big Seven," testified before Congress
in 1999 regarding the role of states as "laboratories of democracy" and
sources of "innovation. '" 97 The head of the National Governors'
Association similarly testified regarding people's "need... to be
governed [by the entities] closest to them."98
Lobbyists very often raise issues in other ways as well. For
example, virtually all organizations, including those representing state
interests, contact officials directly or talk shop with them in informal
95. See S. REP. NO. 106-159, at 10 n.52 (1999) ("The 'Big 7' includes the National
Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National
Association of Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the Council of State Governments,
the National League of Cities, and the International City/County Management
Association."); Bermann, supra note 87, at 96-97 (describing these organizations as
influential both in legislative and administrative settings and as "develop[ing] a federalism
'constituency' of unprecedented political strength"); Garrett, supra note 77, at 1131 (noting
that state interest groups provide solidary and special benefits that facilitate organizing and
overcoming free rider problems).
96. For example, Marci Hamilton notes that no states or state organizations were
invited to testify on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 99;
see also Johanna Hartwig, No State Left Behind? Protection of State Interests in the Passage
of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (documenting extent of state participation in No Child Left Behind Act).
97. See Senate Hearings on Federalism, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Tommy G.
Thompson, Governor, State of Wis., and President, Council of State Governments); see also
id. at 6 ("Time and time again, we have developed and passed legislation to deal with our
unique problems...."); id. at 22 (statement of Daniel T. Blue, Jr., Majority Leader, N.C.
H.R., and President, Nat'l Conf. of State Legs.) ("State and local governments [can]
experiment, [can] figure out specific solutions for specific problems, [and] ... are better
suited to... deal with their unique nature.").
9& See Senate Hearings on Federalism, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Michael 0.
Leavitt, Governor, State of Utah, and Vice Chair, Nat'l Governors' Ass'n); id. at 14-15
(arguing that states and national government must have ability to balance each other).
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settings.99 Both a member of Congress and her legislative staff will
typically make time to meet with state organizations, especially
organizations from the member's home state.' ° A number of state
organizations met extensively with members of Congress in 2000 to
encourage them to support normalized trade relations with China. °' A
member of Congress might have an incentive to consider the views of
these organizations to the extent their views are shared by the
member's home state or by the state's voters (or reflect the member's
own ideological preferences)."0
As Kramer has argued, another set of "extraconstitutional"
safeguards may ensure congressional consideration of state interests.
These include national political parties, which, he argues, serve to link
the electoral success of federal politicians with that of state
politicians,1 3 and the dependence of the federal government on state
administrators to carry out programs, which creates a natural incentive
for Congress to listen to state views as it makes policy decisions."
Further, many members of Congress may have a particular affinity for
state interests, because they began their career in state governments. 05
Finally, members of Congress are free to advocate federalist values
based on their personal ideological views.
Some scholars have suggested state interests are underrepresented
because the groups and individuals discussed above may not
consistently advocate federalist - or anti-preemption - positions.
99. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 149 (1986).
100. See, e.g., Suzanne Nelson, Frist Gets Acquainted with Mayor of D.C., ROLL CALL,
Mar. 4, 2003, http://www.rollcall.com/pub/48_65/news/732-1.html (describing Senate
Majority Leader Frist's and Minority Leader Daschle's meetings with Washington, D.C.,
Mayor Anthony Williams in connection with National League of Cities' concerns).
101. Susan Crabtree, Morning Business, ROLL CALL, May 8, 2000 (describing visits of
officials of U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Conference of State Legislatures, and
National Association of Counties to "buttonhole fence-sitting Democrats on the Hill" to
support permanent normalized trade relations with China).
102. Cf Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82
(1990) (describing politicians' motives as ranging from reelection to power and prestige to
the desire to make good public policy).
103. See Kramer, Putting Politics Back, supra note 76, at 278; Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1538-41 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding
Federalism] (arguing that party affiliation builds "bonds," and for presence of political
culture of working together on elections).
104. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 79, at 1478 ("Political scientists have
documented the remarkable extent to which national programs (especially New Deal ones)
depend upon state administrators for their success."); Kramer, Putting Politics Back, supra
note 76, at 280; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 103, at 1543-54.
105. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Federalism, supra note 15, at 3 (statement of Sen.
Levin) ("Many of us in the Senate... have served as either governors, mayors, or State
legislators before coming to the Senate.").
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Individual voters may be insensitive to the "governance needs" of
state and local institutions."° Moreover, Hamilton, Cross, and
Calabresi have all questioned the view that state and local politicians,
given the opportunity, would consistently espouse federalist values,
largely because their personal political ambitions may cause them to
focus on seeking federal largesse or on cozying up with federal
officials in the hopes of joining their ranks."°7 To press these analyses
further, even if state governors or state legislatures would favor
preserving state autonomy for its own sake, state agency officials -
often consulted by Congress - may sympathize with, or desire,
federal regulatory action1°8 A state official may "welcome[] rather
than fear federal.., mandates, because they comport with his or her
own thinking about governmental priorities."1 °9 For example, in
August 2003, the Environmental Council of the States, an association
representing the heads of state environmental agencies, passed a
resolution noting the difficulties states would have reducing mercury
contamination in their waters under the current state-centered
approach,"' instead calling on the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to "develop a National Mercury Reduction Strategy... so that
States and EPA may use the strategy.., to assure attainment of water
106. See Kramer, Putting Politics Back, supra note 76, at 222. Kramer nonetheless
defends the "extraconstitutional safeguards" described as an adequate substitute. See supra
text accompanying notes 103-104. See also Steven Calabresi, supra note 76, at 795-96
(arguing that participation of local voters creates incentive for members of Congress to
expand national power so as to increase ability to distribute federal " 'pork,' " rather than
attending to federalism concerns).
107. Calabresi argues that state and local politicians will be more interested in "federal
largesse" than constitutional structure. Calabresi, supra note 76, at 798. Hamilton argues that
because state politicians want to become national politicians, they will "kowtow" to federal
officials rather than confront them, and thus cannot be trusted to take state-supportive
positions. See Hamilton, supra note 78, at 98. But see HILLS, supra note 52, at 19-20 (arguing
that state officials' political ambitions will make them policy entrepreneurs). Cross argues
that state politicians are typically beholden to federal officials for electoral assistance rather
than the other way around. See Cross, supra note 75, at 9. Meanwhile, others argue that
voters alone may not be sensitive to state government interests. E.g., Young, supra note 1
(arguing that state government regulatory prerogatives are essential to governments'
developing loyalty from citizens).
10& See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1218
(1999) ("[E]lected officials will have a greater incentive to divert federal funds.., much
more than the nonelected policy professionals employed by state and local agencies - so-
called 'policy specialists.' ").
109. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic
Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001).
110. The Clean Water Act currently asks each individual state to develop a "total
maximum daily load" for mercury in each of its waters and then provides the state with the
discretion to decide which parties will reduce mercury discharges. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)
(2000).
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quality standards."'' 1 State agency officials also may prefer more
uniform regulatory regimes among states, because it maintains their
personal marketability and job options between states. Federal
regulation, of course, would further these goals.
Further, state associations, such as the National Governors'
Association and others, may not consistently espouse federalist values,
because state views may differ on whether federal regulation is
appropriate.112 Baker and Young have suggested that some states may
prefer national regulation in areas such as environmental protection,
which may give them advantages over other states or protect them
from externalities imposed by neighboring states' regulation.
1 3
Finally, Hills has argued that pro-state autonomy views may be
blunted by the advocacy of well-organized interest groups, such as
business trade associations. He argues that these groups are likely to
strongly prefer uniform national rules."4 To the extent private groups
that raise anti-preemption views tend to be poorly organized and to
"lack the unifying interest in regulatory diversity for its own sake,"'' 5
state interests could further be seen as underrepresented in
Congress." 6
These arguments about the ambivalence of states and allied groups
are meant to suggest that Congress, in response, might inappropriately
reduce the value it attaches to a strong, independent state role." 7
111. ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL MERCURY
REDUCTION STRATEGY AS AN OPTION FOR ATMOSPHERIC MERCURY TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LOADS (TMDLs) (2003), at http://www.sso.org/ecos/policy/resolutions/Resolution%
2003-7.pdf.
112. See Baker & Young, supra note 80. Garrett also notes the possibility that divergent
views within state organizations will impede states from defining a uniform position on some
issues. Garrett, supra note 77, at 1123 ("Disagreement can stem not only from ideological or
policy differences; it can also occur because some national policies affect individual states
and localities in different ways .. " (citations omitted)).
113. See Baker & Young, supra note 80.
114. HILLS, supra note 52, at 15 (hypothesizing that "regulated industries that support
preemption have a greater capacity to elicit congressional debate on these issues than the
interest groups that oppose preemption"). Hills compiles significant anecdotal support. But
see Felicity Barringer, Some Rules We Like, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1982, at A15 (quoting
former head of Federal Insurance Association saying that industry " 'would rather be
regulated by 50 monkeys than King Kong.' "); see also Helen Dewar, Panel Votes to Cut
Power of FTC Over Professions, WASH. POST, Sep. 24, 1982, at A2 (noting that organized
professions prefer state regulation to FTC).
115. HILLS, supra note 52, at 24. But see Baker & Young, supra note 80 (arguing that
some states will seek preemption in order to avoid effects of other state laws).
116. Hills accordingly argues that in order to encourage legislative debate, courts
should use the presumption against preemption to place the burden on the well-organized
groups to seek favorable legislation, rather than on the states or on more poorly organized
groups. HILLS, supra note 52, at 16 (arguing that state legislation "prods the regulated
interests to seek federal legislation preempting the states").
117. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 78.
March 20041
HeinOnline  -- 102 Mich. L. Rev. 765 2003-2004
Michigan Law Review
However, it is not clear why states would be poor representatives of
"federalism"-type views, or why we should view preferences expressed
by state groups as tainted. There is, of course, a view, subject to
longstanding debate, that we should doubt a government decision that
merely serves expressed preferences.118 Expressed preferences may,
for example, stem from fleeting passions or be unreasoned.119 That
position seems to have little force with respect to states and state
organizations, however. Presumably the position a state organization
expresses to Congress is taken only after some reasoned deliberation
has already occurred within the organization. 20
In any event, this Article generally assumes that the National
Governors' Association and other state associations, state officials,
state voters, and allied groups, if given the opportunity to do so and if
adequately organized, will express preferences that will reasonably
include federalist values.'2 ' This assumption is generally more
consistent with the "political safeguards" view, which does not dictate
a particular set of outcomes, but instead relies on the opportunity to
present views in the political process. Further, to the extent state
officials or state organizations do not press state-related views or anti-
preemption groups are not well-organized, any resulting "problems"
in the representation of state interests would afflict not only
congressional deliberations, but also agency consideration of these
122views.
Assuming, therefore, that federalism values are important and that
states and state organizations will express them if given the
opportunity, does Congress have a greater incentive than agencies to
consider state interests? My focus is upon the feature of congressional
structure most relied upon by opponents of deference to
administrative preemption interpretations: that members of Congress
are elected in regional or state-based elections. This turns out,
118. Cf. Bermann, supra note 87, at 146 ("[I]f as many different and important values
rest on regulatory federalism as we are inclined to believe, then it does not seem that simple
mood swings and impulses can possibly ever be an adequate safeguard.").
119. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), at 58-59 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting fallibility of "reason of man" and prospect that mankind will be "inflamed... with
mutual animosity" as sources of faction problem).
120. But see HILLS, supra note 52, at 9-10 (suggesting that Big Seven may have difficulty
formulating consistent positions).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 106-111 (noting substantial debate on this
point). Truly poor representation of state-centered interests by state groups, state officials,
and state voters might, of course, lead supporters of federalism values to argue that judicial
protection is necessary.
122. Hills's complaint that anti-preemption groups are less well-organized might have
slightly more purchase in the legislative context, since the level of organization of a group
might be relevant not only to its ability to provide information and communicate preference
intensity to the decisionmaking officials, but also to its ability to supply campaign
contributions, which has less direct relevance to agency officials.
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however, to give Congress no special advantage with respect to a
number of important federalism values, and may result in Congress
undervaluing these interests relative to the agencies."2
In particular, some federalism benefits may be national in nature.
For example, consider the argument that states can serve as
"laboratories" for testing different approaches to national policy
problems. Even an individual voter or state official fully committed to
preserving her state's regulatory role may value having the state retain
flexibility to develop an individual approach to a policy problem, as
well as valuing the particular approach the home state wishes to take.
However, that flexibility also creates benefits outside the state's
boundaries. Providing the rest of the states and the federal
government an opportunity to learn from a particular state's unique
attempts to solve its local problems is a value that accrues nationally.
Independent of one's ideological views on welfare policy, for example,
the State of Wisconsin's experimentation with its welfare programs in
the mid-1990s unquestionably not only affected Wisconsin residents,
but also supplied valuable information to policymakers both in the
federal government and in other states. 24 As a general rule, the
intensity of an individual voter's preferences, or even those of a
particular state official, that the state government retain autonomy on
a particular issue may not signal the full benefits of autonomy to
members of their state delegations in Congress. Those members in
turn are unlikely to fully value these sorts of benefits.125 Consequently,
123. Consistent with other arguments regarding representation of state interests in
Congress, my view implicitly takes a view of congressional and agency decisionmaking that is
more pluralist in nature. See also, e.g., Bermann, supra note 87; Wechsler, supra note 79. If
one sees Congress and the agencies as fitting a more deliberative model, then the process
might be viewed as sufficient to represent state interests if those interests are effectively
advocated within the context of the process. Then legislators (in the case of Congress) would
choose the appropriate outcome following a vigorous debate. Similarly, agency officials
would choose the appropriate result following a full airing of the issues. See, e.g., Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511 (1992) (arguing the administrative state can be conceptualized as a civic republican
institution).
If the institutions are conceptualized in this way, then any comparative advantage either
has over the other would largely disappear. The critical issue would be whether state views
are adequately presented. As discussed below, they appear to be presented in both
processes. Even with a deliberative conception, therefore, Congress would not have a clear
political accountability advantage over the agencies.
124. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Wisconsin Acts to End Welfare Entirely, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 1996, at A26 (describing national debate on Wisconsin welfare program); Editorial,
Welfare Reform, Done Harshly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at A18 (discussing Wisconsin's
policies and relationship with national policy).
125. Neighboring state officials or voters could conceivably signal the benefits they
receive from such flexibility to their representatives in Congress. But neighboring state
officials or voters may have only a limited amount of "political capital," making it less likely
that Ohio and its voters, say, would try to motivate the Ohio delegation on an issue that is
centrally of interest to Indiana. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 87, at 115 (arguing that
members of Congress likely to be guided primarily by factors other than "[f]ederalism values
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the regional structure offers no pronounced advantage over a national
perspective in ensuring that members fully consider federalism values.
Federalism's claimed advantage of dividing power among the
different structures of American government similarly has national
aspects. Some states may seek protection of their regulatory
perquisites in areas such as health or education, but benefits from the
resulting reduction of national power will accrue more widely than
simply to the citizens of those states. To the extent a reduction in
national power reduces the risks to liberty presented by overly
concentrated federal authority, all citizens benefit, not simply those in
the state seeking regulatory autonomy.
Although the regional structure will give Congress no special
advantage in considering these more "national" federalism benefits,
the fact that members of Congress come from particular districts and
states probably does give them a particular incentive to focus on state
interests that have especially regional aspects. For example, Michigan
state officials may well perceive better opportunities in Congress,
rather than within the executive branch, for the consideration of Great
Lakes environmental issues or issues affecting the automobile industry
and its employees. They may reasonably expect vigorous
representation from members of their congressional delegation. The
Michigan congressional delegation, including both Democrats and
Republicans, has delivered such representation in its recent opposition
to more stringent fuel economy standards for new cars. 126
Congress may, of course, hear from state organizations such as the
National Governors' Association that deliberate internally before
formulating their positions. These organizations may fully value
federalism benefits, including those more national in nature, and may
transmit their views to members of Congress. However, these
organizations can present their views to administrative agencies as
well. Assuming that these organizations are interested in benefits that
accrue nationally, such as benefits from the dispersion of power or the
preservation of states as centers of democracy and policy
experimentation, it is unclear why members of Congress would have
any special incentive (beyond their incentive to respond to the officials
of their particular state) to respond to the organizational views. l 7
as such," particularly "the substantive policy interests of their constituency on [a given] issue
and ... the content and weight of the national interest on that issue").
126. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Pitting Fuel Economy Against Safety, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2003, at Cl ("In 1999, Michigan's senators, [Democrat] Carl Levin and [Republican] Spencer
Abraham... wrote to colleagues that higher [corporate average fuel economy] standards
would equal more vehicle deaths because cars would be made too light.").
127. A state official can oppose a member of Congress running for reelection, but such
opposition seems likely to be most persuasive to voters if it is centered on the value (or lack
thereof) to the state's voters of having the member represent the state in Congress. As
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Similarly, while members of Congress also may be motivated by
ideological concern for federalism, Congress would seem to have no
structural advantage over the President and executive branch agencies
in considering such values.28
2. Agency Incentives to Consider State Interests
How might agency "political safeguards" for federalism compare
with those provided by the congressional process? Though scholars
have not spelled it out in great detail, the argument in favor of
congressional superiority essentially would be that federal agency
administrators are not elected, and hence have no particular incentive
to be responsive to individual states or regions. 129
A closer examination suggests, however, that despite this
portrayal, agencies have some significant incentives to consider
federalism values, and even some comparative advantages over
Congress in considering values more national in nature. Certainly, like
Congress post-Seventeenth Amendment, the head of an executive
branch agency is not state-chosen. Nor are agency officials elected
directly by voters who might value federalism. Still, even without a
direct electoral process, agencies have significant incentives, created
both directly and through presidential oversight, to consider interests
articulated by states or state groups.13°
First, executive branch agencies are accountable not only to
Congress, but to the President, herself an elected official.' The
President and Vice President are the only federal officials that must
appeal to a national constituency to win or retain office. The
President's desire for reelection supplies an incentive both for the
President and for administrative agencies reporting to her to respond
to public preferences.
Recent administrative law commentary has relied very heavily on
presidential control over executive branch agencies as a means of
ensuring their democratic responsiveness, and as a more general
discussed supra note 125, the voters' interests are likely to undervalue the more national
federalism benefits.
128. See Bermann, supra note 87, at 115; infra text accompanying notes 139-142
(discussing President's national perspective on issues).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
130. As I argue below, there may be other reasons to confine agency attention to those
factors clearly defined by statute, rather than encouraging agencies to consider broad issues
of politics and governmental structure. See infra text accompanying notes 225-238.
131. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility
to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
321, 329 (1990) (noting that agency officials spend much time "responding to inquiries or
demands from the President, members of Congress or assorted presidential or congressional
offices").
March 20041
HeinOnline  -- 102 Mich. L. Rev. 769 2003-2004
Michigan Law Review
source of administrative agency legitimacy.3 2 Even if she is not herself
seeking reelection, the President may wish to be perceived as attentive
to national interests in order to satisfy ambitions for achievement, to
assure a historical legacy, or to have a role in selecting her successor.13
Presidents also often have particular incentives to respond to the
interests of states qua states. One reason is the electoral college's role
in the presidential election. That electoral college votes matter is
evidenced in part by the state-by-state nature of presidential
campaigning." Although a President may not need to garner a
majority of the popular vote to win election, "elections over the last
thirty years suggest that virtually every state in the nation is in fact in
play in these contests.' ' 35
Moreover, presidents often are former governors, with an innate
appreciation for the challenges faced by states.'36 Presidents regularly
make statements suggesting their close identification with the role of
governors.13 ' Further, U.S. presidents are regular speakers at
conferences of state officials, such as the National Governors'
Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures. 138
132. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) [hereinafter Farina, Consent of the
Governed] ("Increasingly, scholars (and, at times, the judiciary) look to the President not
only to improve the managerial competence and efficiency with which regulation occurs but
also, and more deeply, to supply the elusive essence of democratic legitimation."). See
generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485 (2003) (discussing presidential control
theorists' "vision of administration").
133. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2335
(2001).
134. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1994) ("[M]ost modern presidents probably see their potential
electoral base as comprehending up to 60% of all voters and perhaps as many as 90% of all
state electoral college votes." (citations omitted)) Of course, the presidential candidates are
attempting to show their attentiveness to state concerns by appealing not only to state
officials, but also to individual voters.
135. Id.
136. Four of the most recent five presidents (George W. Bush, Clinton, Reagan, and
Carter) served as state governors.
137. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks to the National Conference of State
Legislatures, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 386 (Mar. 2, 2001) (in searching for cabinet
members, "I looked ... for fellow Governors, because I strongly believe that there needs to
be appropriate balance between the Federal Government and the State governments.");
George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Governors' Association Meeting, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 343 (Feb. 26, 2001) ("I've sat where you're sitting, and I know what it's
like to have a good idea and then to wait on the Federal Government to tell you whether
you can try it or not."); William J. Clinton, Statement on the Executive Order on
Federalism, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1561 (Aug. 9, 1999) ("As a former Governor, I
know how important it is for the American people that the Federal Government and State
and local governments work together as partners.").
138. See Address at the National Governors' Conference, 1969 PUB. PAPERS 694 (Sept.
1, 1969) (remarks of President Nixon); sources cited supra note 137.
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Apart from the fact that she is an official with a national
constituency and, like members of Congress, may have a particular
cultural affinity for state interests, the President also is likely to
respond to informal congressional pressure to consider states' interests
in order to avoid political costs and to forestall binding legislative
action. For example, when President Clinton revised the presidential
executive order on federalism - aimed at assuring that agencies
consider state interests - in a way that was perceived to be less
protective of state prerogatives, he withdrew the new order and
revised it in response to pressure both from state groups and from
House hearings. 39  Michael Graetz has argued that "uniform
opposition of governors and mayors was an important - perhaps even
decisive - factor in dissuading President Nixon from proposing a
value-added tax."14 In 1996, President Clinton suggested that he had
signed welfare, reform legislation in response to demands from
governors, which included a 1995 National Governors' Association
policy statement seeking flexibility.141 Although the lack of a baseline
makes it difficult to precisely document just how much influence states
have with the President, the President appears to have a significant
incentive to consider the interests of states.
In addition to possessing incentives to respond to state interests,
the President may possess a comparative advantage over Congress in
the ability to fully consider federalism benefits that are more national
in nature. Compared with congressional campaigns, Presidential
campaigns are generally more focused on issues that resonate
nationally. As Mashaw puts it, rather than responding to merely
parochial interests, "issues of national scope and the candidates'
positions on those issues are the essence of presidential politics." '42 A
139. See generally S. REP. No. 106-159, at 10-11 (1999) (describing congressional
demand, at behest of states, that order be withdrawn and revised and noting that state
organizations found "the new order was a substantial improvement over" the old one);
Senate Hearings on Federalism, supra note 15, at 17 (statement of Michael 0. Leavitt,
Governor, State of Utah, and Vice Chair, Nat'l Governors' Ass'n) (describing negotiations,
ongoing at the time, between White House and Big Seven).
140. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 210
(1997).
141. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al (" 'The governors,' Mr. Clinton noted, 'asked for this
responsibility. Now they've got to live up to it.' "); Robert Pear, Governors Agree Children
Must Be Protected No Matter What Shape Welfare Takes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at A19
(describing National Governors' Association policy statement seeking flexibility for states
seeking to enact welfare reform laws).
142. MASHAW, supra note 54, at 152; see also id. ("The president has no particular
constituency to which he or she has special responsibility to deliver benefits."); Terry M.
Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 279
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) ("[P]residents have incentives to think in
grander terms about what is best for society as a whole, or at least broad chunks of it, and
they have their own agendas .... ); Farina, Consent of the Governed, supra note 132, at 991;
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voter's choice of a particular candidate may not necessarily send a
clear message on a particular policy issue (such as how to set drinking
water standards), but may well be decided "in accordance with [the
voter's] perception of a candidate's general ideology." '143 The size of
the federal government and its responsibilities relative to states are
themes that recur frequently in presidential campaigns.
Due to this national perspective, to the extent a policy preferred by
one state may have some positive consequences for another, the
President may be better able than Congress to register the full
intensity of the public's preferences. As a consequence, the President
may be more apt to consider the "national" benefits of federalism,
such as the extent to which states can serve as centers of policy
experimentation or democracy or serve as a means of dividing power
among units of government. As Steven Calabresi has argued, the
national election makes more likely the prospect that the "President
will turn into the spokesperson of a centrist majority coalition,
composed of numerous shifting minority elements," even protecting
the "national commons from regional selfishness."'" The President's
national constituency will give the President an ability and incentive
not only to more fully consider policies that will benefit the nation as a
whole, but to encourage agencies reporting to her to do so.145
Concededly, particularly regional concerns that are not shared
with states across the nation, such as Great Lakes management
concerns of the State of Michigan, may be more likely to receive direct
expression in Congress (say, by the Michigan delegation) than in a
presidential electoral process or by a presidential candidate. To the
extent we see these sorts of regional concerns as most important in a
regime that assures a significant degree of autonomy to states, we
might conclude that Congress's comparative advantages in considering
these interests dominate the advantages offered by presidential
decisionmaking. However, federalism advocates place considerable
emphasis upon federalism benefits that are more national in nature. 14 6
Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam 's
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 125-26 (2000) ("Enhanced presidential control over
regulatory policymaking is advocated as the means through which the interests of the nation
can triumph over the geographical parochialism and special-interest pandering that drive the
rest of the political process."); Kagan, supra note 133, at 2335 ("[B]ecause the President has
a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely
parochial interests.").
143. Seidenfeld, supra note 123, at 1568-69.
144. Calabresi, supra note 134, at 98-99 (discussing presidential role, especially in
protecting "budgetary commons" from regional raids).
145. See MASHAW, supra note 54, at 131-57 (discussing President's service to national
constituency). See generally Kagan, supra note 133 (discussing presidential means of holding
agencies accountable).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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As to these, it would seem that the President would have the
advantage over Congress.
One indication of presidential willingness to credit federalism
values (though not necessarily of agency expertise or commitment to
considering such values, as discussed below147), is the series of
executive orders beginning with the 1982 Executive Order No.
12,372,148 "Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs," and
culminating in the series of federalism executive orders. Since Reagan,
each President has maintained such an order in one form or another.
Executive Order No. 13,132, "Federalism," in effect since August
1999, requires an agency to consult with state and local officials to
avoid conflicts between federal and state laws and before proposing to
limit state policymaking discretion.149 Among other key requirements,
the Executive Order also instructs agencies to restrict regulatory
preemption of state law to the "minimum level necessary."'5 ° Finally,
an agency promulgating any regulation with federalism implications or
that preempts state law is to submit a federalism impact statement to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including a report on
consultation with state and local officials. 5' In this most recent
Executive Order, the President (Clinton, in this case) declares that
agencies "shall be guided" by a number of "fundamental federalism
principles," including that "issues that are not national in scope or
significance are most appropriately addressed by the level of
government closest to the people," that the states can serve as
"laboratories of democracy," and that states can experiment with a
variety of public policy approaches.'52
It could be objected that presidents do not wholly control agencies,
in part due to resource constraints, and thus cannot guarantee the
147. See infra text accompanying notes 173-203.
148. Exec. Order No. 12,372, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (July 14, 1982).
149. Exec. Order No. 13,132, §§ 3-4, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). President
George W. Bush also established an "Interagency Working Group on Federalism" and
directed it to identify federalism-promoting initiatives and to draft a new executive order on
federalism. See Memorandum on the Interagency Working Group on Federalism, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 344 (Feb. 26, 2001).
150. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 4(c), 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,256.
151. Id. at § 6(c). Opinions vary on whether the federalism impact assessment
requirements are making any practical difference to rulemaking. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12612 IN
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (May 5, 1999) (reporting rare preparation of federalism
impact statements), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99093t.pdf; Hills, supra
note 109, at 1244 ("Most legislative or administrative devices for the avoidance of federal
mandates have been widely acknowledged to be toothless failures."). As with evidence of
state "success" or "failure" in the congressional process, reaching an empirical conclusion is
very difficult, because there is little against which to compare either the agency
decisionmaking process or the substantive outcome.
152. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,255-56.
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consideration of particular interests. 5 3 For example, the federalism
executive orders have not been terribly successful in getting agencies
to consider more generalized federalism values.'54 Even so, it is
reasonable to think that presidential policies have some effect on
agency decisionmaking. As discussed below, although agencies may
not have incorporated the more abstract benefits of "federalism" into
their decisionmaking, agencies do appear to have systematically
consulted with states. Thus, they may be honoring state interests as
states have expressed them.
Even with significant slack in the president-agency relationship,
agencies possess some independent incentives to hear from states and
state organizations and to fully consider state interests as the agencies
formulate policy. First, independent of incentives created by reporting
to the President, federal agency officials may recognize their
dependence on state institutions and officials to successfully
implement federal programs. As other scholars have argued, Congress
depends to some degree on states to carry out federal programs.'55 By
comparison, agencies constantly have states as partners in
implementation. Under a number of federal programs, for example,
states enforce their own laws "in lieu of" federal laws.'56 Beyond this,
there are countless examples of informal federal agency cooperation
with state and local agencies in the form of "memoranda of
understanding" or "memoranda of agreement," which may delegate
federal implementation responsibility to states, result in cooperative
enforcement efforts, or devise cooperative procedures for resolving
issues."' The presence of these ongoing cooperative relationships and
153. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 133, at 2334 (noting prospect that "considerable
swaths" of agency decisionmaking would, even in best case, remain "impervious to
presidential direction"); Bressman, supra note 132, at 505 (noting limitations on presidential
ability to control agencies).
154. See Bermann, supra note 87, at 93 ("By all accounts, the Executive Orders on
federalism are of limited utility.... A study by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations reports that the Reagan federalism order was in fact routinely
ignored."); infra text accompanying notes 200-203.
155. See supra text accompanying note 104.
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000) (provision of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act permitting state, if approved by EPA Administrator, to carry out own
hazardous waste program "in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter in such
State," including issuance and enforcement of permits to disposal facilities).
157. See, e.g., Office of Envtl. Servs., Ohio Dep't of Transp., Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Fed. Highway Admin., the Ohio State Historic Preservation
Office, and the Ohio Dep't of Transp. for Projects with No Potential to Cause Effects:
ODOT Maintenance and Minor Highway Projects (executed Apr. 14, 2003) (describing
consensual process for addressing projects raising historical preservation issues), at
www.dot.state.oh.us/oes/106%20agreement.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., the State
Historic Preservation Office, and the Hous. Auth. for the Homes Revitalization Project, at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/energyenviron/environment/compliance/qa/historicpropertie
smou.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2004) (model agreement); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S.
[Vol. 102:737
HeinOnline  -- 102 Mich. L. Rev. 774 2003-2004
Chevron and Preemption
the desire of federal agency officials to maintain them creates a strong
incentive for agency officials to listen to state views even in areas
where no formal cooperative arrangement presently exists.
Second, agency officials recognize the political costs that may come
- often through the congressional process - from not taking state
concerns into account. For example, EPA administers schemes under
which it may delegate federal authorities to state governments or
authorize them to enforce their own laws in lieu of federal
requirements. EPA has rarely, if ever, revoked a delegation of
responsibility to a state government (though it has a few times
threatened to do so).' In part this is because the agency depends on
state governments to carry the burden of administering the air and
water pollution and solid waste disposal permitting programs and does
not want, by revoking the program of one state, to create an
atmosphere of uncertainty for other state programs. In part it is
because EPA unquestionably recognizes the prospect of a political
backlash in Congress from states, a backlash that might cause
Congress to limit the agency's own administrative authority.159
Third, federal agency officials - like some members of Congress'6°
- also may be willing to consider state viewpoints, especially if they
or their colleagues have worked in state governments. Kramer has
asserted that for this reason, federal officials may be "culturally
sensitive" to state institutional concerns.6 The cultural sensitivity may
Dep't of the Interior, Partnerships with States, at http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/
grants.pdf (Mar. 2003) (describing partnerships to implement endangered species
protections); U.S. Geological Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Cooperative Water Program:
Description of the Program, at http://water.usgs.gov/coop/description.html (last modified
Jan. 9, 2003) (describing federal, state, local, and tribal cooperative efforts to monitor water
resource usage and quality); see also Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Agency Policies & Directives Related to State Plans, at
http://www.osha.gov/fso/osp/policiesdirectives.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004) (list of OSHA
directives and policies related to the 26 states that are authorized to administer the
Occupational Safety and Health Act).
158. See Clifford Rechtshaffen & David Markell, Improving State Environmental
Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other
Strategies, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,559 (2003) ("EPA has rarely if ever actually withdrawn a
state's authorization (although... it did quasi-revoke Maryland's Title V authority in
2001).").
159. For example, even a decision by EPA to file environmental enforcement litigation
in a single case after a state has already resolved a claim can create significant political
tension. See Erik R. Lehtinen, Virginia as a Case Study: EPA Should Be Willing to Withdraw
NPDES Permitting Authority from Deficient States, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 617, 629 (1999) ("The rare instances of overfiling that are initiated by [the] federal
government can strain relations between EPA and states to the breaking point.").
160. See supra note 105 (quoting Sen. Levin's statement at Senate hearing on
federalism).
161. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 103, at 1551-52. But see S. REP.
No. 106-159, at 18 (1999) (arguing that "unelected staff and career civil servants... may
have little knowledge or concern for the states and localities that may be affected by the
federal statutes ... for which they are responsible").
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be enhanced by the geographic proximity of state and federal agency
officials. For example, the vast majority of federal agencies, if not all,
maintain regional offices, including EPA and the Departments of
Labor, Agriculture (including the U.S. Forest Service), Justice,
Housing and Urban Development, and Health and Human Services.'62
These regional offices were probably created partly in order to
"ma[k]e it possible for governors and mayors to do their business with
those agencies at one time and in one place."163
That agencies actually respond to these incentives to consider state
interests seems anecdotally confirmed by public agency reports of
meetings with state organizations during a policy making process.
Agencies regularly report either that they solicited state government
input prior to developing a policy or that they have "worked closely
with ... State Government agencies.., in developing [the policy at
hand]."'" Numerous agencies also have reported responding
specifically to state comments during rulemaking and other policy
development processes. 65 Further, some agencies, such as the EPA,
162. For a sampling of the many federal agency regional offices, see Forest Serv., U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Regional Areas of the Forest Service, at http://www.fs.fed.us/contactus/
regions.shtml (last modified Mar. 11, 2004); Rural Dev., U.S. Dep't of Agric., State Offices,
at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/recd-map.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004); U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., Housing: Which Homeownership Center to Contact?, at http://www.
hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hoc/hsghocs.cfm (last modified Jan. 17, 2002); U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Find It! By Location, at http://www.dol.gov/dolllocation.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004)
(links to Labor Department regional offices); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, About EPA:
Regions, at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/locate2.htm (last modified Feb. 10, 2004).
163. See Address at the National Governors' Conference, 1969 PUB. PAPERS 694, 698
(Sept. 1, 1969) (remarks of President Nixon).
164. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Data Collection Program: Reporting of Final
Adverse Actions, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,740, 57,758 (Oct. 26, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
61) (reporting that HHS "contacted each State Governor ... and continues to work with the
States"). The Federal Register contains countless such statements. See, e.g., National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations; Radon-222, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,246, 59,350 (proposed Nov. 2,
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-42) (reporting that EPA "initiated consultations"
with state officials through meetings with Association of State Drinking Water
Administrators, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, state
environmental and health officials, and others); Clarification to Interim Standards and
Practices for All Appropriate Inquiry Under CERCLA and Notice of Future Rulemaking
Action, 68 Fed. Reg. 3478, 3481 (proposed Jan. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 312)
(reporting intention to obtain "diverse array of input from.., state program officials" and
others); Conforming the Federal Railroad Administration's Accident/Incident Reporting
Requirements to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Revised Reporting
Requirements; Other Amendments, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,108, 10,134 (Mar. 3, 2003) (to be
codified at 49 CFR pts. 219, 225 & 240) (reporting meetings with organization "on which
several representatives of groups representing State and local officials sit"); Notice: 2003
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act National Meeting, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,904 (Mar. 18,
2003) (reporting upcoming national meeting to bring together variety of national and state
organizations as well as "state governments and tribes" to discuss hazardous waste
management issues). But see S. REP. No. 106-159, at 10 (1999) (noting failure of executive
branch to consult with states over terms of 1998 federalism executive order).
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maintain particular policies of soliciting comments from state and local
governments before issuing rules or taking other actions."
Thus, contrary to the perception that agencies are not structured to
represent the interests of states, they may have significant incentives
to consider those interests. 67 Due both to their accountability to the
President and their national structure, agencies may also possess a
comparative advantage in considering federalism benefits that are
national in nature, such as the value of encouraging state policy
experimentation and the value of dividing power between different
levels of government.
3. State Opportunity to Participate in Agency Decisionmaking
Besides the advantages noted above, under the Administrative
Procedure Act,"6  states and state organizations may possess
procedural advantages in agency decisionmaking that are unavailable
in Congress. These procedural advantages may increase the chances
that an agency hears and takes seriously arguments relating to
federalism values and state interests. In formal agency adjudication, a
state that is a party to the adjudication is entitled to submit briefs and
present evidence. 69 Further, as with any other entity interested in
165. For a few of the numerous examples, see Truck Size and Weight, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,302, 23,306 (June 5, 1984) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 658) (request for comments on
final DOT rule discussing participation by states in development of approved highways list
for large commercial vehicles); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,154 (July 25, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 & 68) ("In an effort to reconcile the state and federal roles [in
regulating telemarketing], we have conducted several meetings with the states and FTC.");
Notice: FEMA Guidance for the Use of Portable (Hand-Held) Radiological Instruments, 68
Fed. Reg. 6745, 6746 (Feb. 10, 2003) (responding to state comments regarding time required
to monitor individual for radiological contamination by "provid[ing] suggestions on how
State and local governments may address this issue"); Rio Grande Electric Cooperative, Inc;
Finding of No Significant Impact, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,618, 44,618 (Nov. 20, 1987) (reporting that
finding by Rural Electrification Administration of no significant environmental impact
followed receipt of "input from the public and Federal and State agencies").
166. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7257 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123
& 412) (noting that EPA solicited comment on proposed rule from state and local officials,
"consistent with EPA's policy to promote communications between EPA and State and local
governments").
167. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157 (on cooperative agency-state
relationships). Evan Caminker, however, has argued in the context of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence that generally permitting only federal lawsuits against state governments,
rather than private ones, relies incorrectly on assumptions that federal officials will be
concerned about state interests. See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by
the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 122 (1999) (arguing, among other things, that
"federal prosecutors have no duty of loyalty to states per se").
168. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 556-557 (2000).
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notice-and-comment rulemaking, a state or state organization can
receive notice of a proposed agency action and have the opportunity
to submit comments. Moreover, states also benefit from the judicially
enforced requirement that agencies must respond to significant
comments, which requires reasoned agency consideration of the issues
raised. 171 In Congress, by comparison, a state or state organization
must persuade a Congressman to carry its water in legislative
deliberations. Though she may do so in anticipation of an upcoming
election, the Congressman has no formal legal obligation to explain
her decision not to argue (or to vote) on behalf of a state's interest.
Executive Order 13,132, "Federalism," also requires administrative
agencies considering preemption to provide affected states notice and
an opportunity to participate. 71 Finally, states avail themselves of the
OMB regulatory review process by requesting meetings with OMB.
Based on rulemaking data collected and analyzed by Steven Croley,
states appear to be regular participants in meetings with OMB at the
time of regulatory review. 17 2
In short, viewed from a functional perspective, the argument that
Congress is more politically accountable than administrative agencies
and thus better able to resolve preemption issues seems a weak one.
Despite arguments that agencies are "not designed' to represent state
interests, Congress's structure appears to give it no special advantage
in considering federalism values more national in nature. Meanwhile,
agencies appear to have significant incentives, including both
institutional reasons and presidential control, to afford states an
opportunity to participate in agency decisionmaking and to fully
consider state interests.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249-50 (2d
Cir. 1977).
171. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 4(e), 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999).
States may now assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to formal adjudications. See Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). Admittedly, the
mechanism for enforcement of the Executive Order provision is unclear at best, though to
the extent the agency action involves rulemaking, the Office of Management and Budget can
ensure that the agency has complied with the order at the time of regulatory review. But see
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 151, at 1 (noting that "OMB officials told us
that they have taken no specific actions to implement" Executive Order 12,612).
172- See generally Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Perspective, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 843-45 (2003) (describing method of data
collection). Within a data set of 153 proposed and final rules that underwent regulatory
review during the Clinton administration that appeared in the OMB "log," id. at 854, OMB
conducted solely "intergovernmental" meetings on 8 rules. Id. at 860 tbl.3. OMB also held
meetings on 42 rules that Croley characterizes as "pluralistic." Id. These were rules in which
a number of outside groups expressed an interest and attended meetings. While the data do
not reveal whether state government representatives attended meetings on all these
"pluralistic" rules, the meetings presumably sometimes included state government or state
organization representatives. While this is not a majority of the meetings, it is a higher
frequency than the apparent frequency of preparation of federalism impact analyses by
agencies. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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B. Agency Expertise on Preemption Questions
The evidence suggests that the political accountability of agencies
for considering state interests is likely not worse - and may be
significantly better - than that of either courts or Congress.
Nevertheless, courts should still perceive strong reasons not to defer to
agency decisions on preemption questions. In particular, the relative
institutional competence of agencies in considering federalism values
weighs against deferring to agency interpretations on preemption
questions.173
If an agency were to take into account only those values implicated
by the regulatory scheme it administers, institutional competence
would be hard to question. Many issues raised by states with agencies
appear to implicate the details of regulatory implementation and thus
engage core areas of agency competence. For example, in designing a
national data collection system to address health care fraud and abuse,
the Department of Health and Human Services consulted with state
agencies on the best ways to share and use state-collected data and
modified its proposed system accordingly.'74 And in developing a
standard for radon in drinking water, EPA has sought to adjust its
proposal to take account of state and municipal agency comments
regarding how local circumstances might affect compliance.'75
Moreover, questions of state law preemption do raise some issues
within agency expertise. For example, an agency is likely to be well-
suited to assess the effect of nonuniform state standards upon program
173. For views that institutional competence is a relevant consideration in assigning
primary interpretive responsibility, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that "judges are not experts in the
[environmental policy] field"); Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 954-55 (2003) ("[M]ost
scholars of judicial interpretation have placed institutional considerations and dynamic
consequences.., front and center"); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 886 (looking at
institutional competence and dynamics of response); see also Marshall, supra note 14, at 279
(stating "it is highly problematic to assert that agencies have expertise in determining the
proper balance between federal and state power").
I continue to assume that consideration of federalism values should be part of the
preemption determination. But cf McGreal, supra note 67, at 872 (arguing that agency's
identification of "obstacle preemption" as justification for regulatory preemption should
carry considerable weight because "agency could reliably infer that Congress intended its
regulatory scheme to succeed").
174. See Health Care Fraud and Abuse Data Collection Program: Reporting of Final
Adverse Actions, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,740, 57,741 (Oct. 26, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
61) (discussing consultation with state agencies about circumstances under which state
record of health care provider's "voluntary surrender" of license might be reportable to
national system).
175. See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radon-222, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,246, 59,362-63 (proposed Nov. 2, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-142)
(responding to commenters' argument that standards should be nonuniform across nation's
drinking water supply to take account of local circumstances).
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goals and the level of compliance with a program.176 Consider whether
states may set more stringent environmental standards than those set
by federal law. An environmental agency could assess not only the
effect on the environment, but the likely incentives for regulated
entities as well.
However, relative institutional competence becomes a more
significant issue if we wish agencies to evince concern with preserving
state prerogatives for their own sake. The extent of an administrative
agency's institutional competence on federalism issues, compared with
that of either Congress or the courts, is, of course, an empirical
question that cannot be definitively resolved in any easy way.177
Nonetheless, several factors suggest the inappropriateness of an
across-the-board assumption, such as that made in Chevron, that
agencies are engaging these issues or developing particular
institutional competence.
First, agencies are specialized, not generalized, institutions. Within
the realm of a program delegated by Congress, an agency can
reasonably be expected to have considerable expertise in how its
program functions and experience with entities regulated under the
program. Agencies generally are closely focused on the purposes of a
particular program, as set forth by the statute. 78 That expertise has led
courts to defer to agency interpretations aimed at accomplishing a
statutory purpose, even when the interpretations have departed
significantly from statutory text. Sunstein and Vermeule discuss, for
example, how judges upheld EPA's interpretation of the Safe
Drinking Water Act to give it the discretion to refuse to set a
"maximum contaminant level" standard for lead in drinking water.
The statute required that such a standard be set as close as "feasible"
to the goal of zero. 179 However, EPA's view was that setting such a
standard, while technologically "feasible," might result in public water
systems having to use aggressive corrosion control treatment that
176. See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 928 (arguing that agencies can
assess whether interpretive departures from statutory text will "seriously diminish
predictability or otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme").
177. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, a decision by Congress to expressly delegate
the authority to preempt state law to an agency would require respect by the courts. See
infra text accompanying notes 217-221.
178. Strauss, supra note 131, at 327 ("Agencies are almost wholly the creature[s] of their
statutes, with an overlay of practices and understandings built on them and of judgments
made and acted upon within the discretion that the statute is understood to confer.")
(arguing that within the context of administering particular programs, an agency's
understanding of authorizing statute may evolve); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory
Interpretation, in 3 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION art. 9, at 6 (2002) (arguing that rather than administrative agencies,
"[o]ther legal institutions have responsibilities for coherence and balance"), at
www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9.
179. 42 U.S.C. 300g-l(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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would increase the level of other contaminants in drinking water.' 80
Less flattering, the agency penchant for focusing on particular
programmatic goals to the exclusion of other concerns has led to
"tunnel vision" criticisms. For example, environmental agencies have
been criticized for devoting considerable government resources to
removing the last little bit of risk presented by an identified hazardous
waste site rather than directing those resources to identifying and
addressing other, more significant environmental risks.'
Meanwhile, federalism values raise a distinct category of questions
generally separate from the goals of a particular national program. In
addressing state law preemption, an agency might also consider
concerns of state autonomy, the overall design of government, the
allocation of authority among different levels of government, and in
doing all this, consider the relationship with other legal fields and the
need to maintain a coherent legal order.'8 For example, an agency
might consider the cost that regulatory preemption of a state's
banking or environmental standards might impose upon a state's
dignity or a state's function as a policy "laboratory" or center of
democratic activity. Such a question would raise issues that are
abstract, political, and likely far afield from the other issues implicated
by a federal banking or environmental law. Hence, the federal agency
may be less likely to develop experience or expertise in these
questions. 8'
Moreover, regulators generally are hired for their scientific and
technical expertise. For example, the Office of Personnel
Management's standard listing of qualifications for policy analysis and
180. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 928-29 (discussing American Water Works
Assn. v. EPA, 40 F. 3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding EPA's definition of "stationary source" in
Clean Air Act).
181. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-13 (1993)
(discussing "tunnel vision" in hazardous waste cleanup); Posner, supra note 173, at 967
(noting "deformities" in agency decisionmaking "resulting from specialization"); see also
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 335 (arguing that "tunnel vision" critique
may explain new canon forbidding agencies to require very large expenditures for trivial
gains).
182. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,255-56 (Aug. 4, 1999)
("Fundamental Federalism Principles").
183. Mashaw, supra note 178, at 6 (2002) ("[A]n agency interpretive posture that seeks
to harmonize its actions with the whole of the legal order risks forgetting that agencies are
created precisely to carry out special purpose missions."); see Campbell, supra note 14, at
832 (discussing lack of agency expertise beyond details of particular program). A similar
argument might be made about agency interpretations raising pure legal issues, regarding
which the Supreme Court has confirmed that Chevron deference is appropriate. See Young
v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986). The federalism issues, however, are generally
not only more abstract than the legal issues, but also far afield from the thrust of the
authorizing statute the agency is administering. Cf Bradley, supra note 25, at 694-96
(arguing that while the Department of State and President have foreign relations expertise,
other agencies, such as the EEOC, probably do not).
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administrative analysis positions, for use in all federal executive
branch agencies, focuses on "knowledge of a pertinent professional
subject-matter field," "public policy issues related to [the] subject-
matter field," and a variety of other skills."8 Knowledge of general
governmental structure, however, is not on the list.185 By contrast, a
rare government office, such as the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel, may explicitly require of its new civil servants
knowledge of governmental structure and constitutional law. 6 While
an agency may consider this sort of knowledge in deciding whom to
hire in drafting regulations, it does not appear to be an overt focus of
hiring. Nor are issues of state autonomy normally considered in the
ordinary course of writing rules. 7
Concededly, agencies have had to function under an increasing
number of mandates requiring them to conduct broader analyses in
making regulatory or other policy decisions and to consider factors
such as paperwork burdens, regulatory flexibility, and costs for small
businesses."s In general, these types of requirements are statutory and
require very focused deliberation on an agency decision at hand. For
example, an agency may have to consider certain sorts of costs and
regulatory burdens accompanying a proposed agency standard or
requirement.
The federalism executive order does ask agencies to consider the
more abstract federalism implications of their actions and to refrain
from preempting state law. This aspect of the order, however, does not
seem reflected in published agency analyses of federalism impacts or
to have generated development of agency expertise on federalism
184. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., OPERATING MANUAL: QUALIFICATION
STANDARD FOR POLICY ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS POSITIONS, at
www.opm.gov/qualifications/sec-iv/a/gs-polcy.htm (last modified Mar. 22, 1999).
185. See, e.g., Job Posting, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Protect the Environment: Work at
EPA, Vacancy Information for Environmental Engineer (posted June 19, 2003) (on file with
author) (in announcing open position for engineer that will "develop... and recommend...
enactment of standards of performance for new stationary sources of air pollution... [and]
for hazardous air pollutant sources," employment criteria focus solely on engineering
qualifications and experience).
186. See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Opportunities at OLC, at
www.usdoj.gov/olc/opportunities.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 2003) ("Applicants must have a
J.D. degree .... The ideal candidate will have exceptional academic credentials, judicial
clerkship or comparable experience, strong background in constitutional law, and
outstanding legal research and writing skills."). Most agencies, however, do not advertise for
qualifications of this sort.
187. See Letter from Jonathan Martel, Esq., former EPA official and Arnold & Porter
partner, to Nina Mendelson (June 15, 2003) (on file with author).
188. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12; Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-71; Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20; see also Mashaw, supra
note 178, at 6 (describing cross-cutting statutes).
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values."8 9 This is in part shown by the poor quality of agency analyses,
discussed below, and in part because it is unclear what an agency is to
do if it concludes that a proposal otherwise important to achieving its
statutory goals will injure state prerogatives."
Even with the federalism executive order requirements, agencies
tend to identify possible federalism implications only rarely. Even
when federalism implications are identified, agencies tend not to focus
upon federalism values, such as the need to preserve "core regulatory
functions" of state governments. The rate of federalism impact
assessments, for example, appears quite low. In 1999, the General
Accounting Office reported that only five federalism impact
assessments had been prepared for the over 11,000 final rules agencies
issued between April 1996 and December 1998. A sampling of 600
proposed and final rules during one quarter in 2003 revealed six
federalism impact analyses prepared by agencies. Five were included
in the Federal Register notice of the rule or proposed rule that each
accompanied, and the sixth was reported as on file with the agency.' 9'
189. See HILLS, supra note 52.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 230-234 (suggesting that an agency's statutory
authority may not permit it to change its decisions based on state law prerogatives).
191. These 600 proposed and final rules were issued during the months of April, May,
and June 2003. Rules for which the agency claimed no impact upon federalism and hence
prepared no federalism impact assessment were partially excluded through the use of the
following July 2003 Westlaw search: "Executive Order 13132" and not (%) ((no or not) /s
federalism)." This search did not exclude rules and proposed rules where the agency phrased
its decision not to prepare a federalism impact assessment by explaining that the rule did not
affect the distribution of power between the state and federal government. The remaining
rules were evaluated individually, yielding six where the agency either included a federalism
impact assessment of some sort (five), see Controlled Negative Pressure REDON Fit Testing
Protocol, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,887 (proposed June 6, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)
(notice of OSHA proposed rulemaking about respiratory protection standards); Assigned
Protection Factors, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,036 (proposed June 6, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 1910, 1915 & 1926) (OSHA proposed rule and request for comments about respiratory
protection standards); Hazardous Materials: Requirements for Maintenance,
Requalification, Repair, and Use of DOT Specification Cylinders; Response to Appeals and
Extension of Compliance Dates, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,653 (May 8, 2003) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 107, 171, 173, 177 & 180) (DOT rule about cylinders for containing hazardous
materials); Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Unloading of Intermodal (IM) and UN
Portable Tanks on Transport Vehicles, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,409 (May 30, 2003) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 173, 177 & 178) (DOT rule about transporting hazardous materials);
Transportation of Household Goods; Consumer Protection Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,064
(June 11, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 375 & 377) (DOT interim final rule on
transportation of household goods), or mentioned that it had prepared one and would make
it available to the public on request (one), see Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to
Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan (ALWTRP),
68 Fed. Reg. 35,386 (June 13, 2003) (National Marine Fisheries Service, Department of
Commerce, notice of voluntary limitations on certain types of commercial fishing gear). See
also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 151 (containing analogous figures for 1996
to 1998).
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The data suggest that, at a rate of one-in-a-hundred or less,
federalism impact analyses are scarce at best.19 They also suggest that
agencies might not be fully complying with the federalism executive
order. That conclusion would be further supported if it were
confirmed that other rules have unanalyzed federalism implications.
On the other hand, the data represent a small sample of rulemakings,
and a larger sample might reveal more such analyses. Moreover, what
is reported in the Federal Register might understate the impact of the
federalism impact assessment requirement. If an agency's preparation
of the assessment leads it to forgo a rulemaking altogether, for
example, that decision is unlikely to be reported in the Federal
Register. Nonetheless, the data raise a concern that agencies may not
consider federalism impacts in every appropriate case.
Besides the rate of assessment preparation, the quality of the
analysis in assessments also suggests that agencies are not especially
sensitive to federalism-type values. The 2003 rules with federalism
impact analyses came from the Department of Labor's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Department of Transportation,
and the National Marine Fisheries Service, part of the Department of
Commerce. All five of the impact analyses involved the preemption of
state law.
All of them, however, justified the agency's preemption of state
law primarily or solely in terms of the agency's statutory authority to
do so. Each analysis ended following the agency's claim of statutory
authority to preempt state law. Only one of the five - concerning
Department of Transportation regulation of interstate transportation
of household goods - even acknowledged the interests of states in
protecting their in-state residents through such laws as deceptive trade
practices. 93 None of the five impact analyses acknowledged the values
- endorsed by the executive order - of preserving state
policymaking prerogatives, where possible, or any of the other
federalism values mentioned either in the executive order or in legal
commentary generally.
192. The rate of federalism impact assessment seemed even lower in earlier calendar
quarters, though higher than that reported by the General Accounting Office. In the fourth
calendar quarter of 1998, for example, for 2546 agency rules, I located 9 federalism impact
assessments. To locate the assessments, I ran the following July 2003 Westlaw search in the
Federal Register database, together with a date restriction, to electronically exclude
rulemakings for which no federalism impact assessment was prepared: PR( RULE ) & (
"EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132" "FEDERALISM ASSESSMENT" "FEDERALISM
IMPACT ASSESSMENT") % ( "NOT HAVE FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS" "NOT
HAVE SIGNIFICANT FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS" "NOT HAVE A
SUBSTANTIAL DIRECT EFFECT ON STATES" "NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
FEDERALISM"). I then sifted through the remaining rulemakings by hand.
193. See Transportation of Household Goods; Consumer Protection Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. at 35,089 (rejecting suggestion that rule should announce that it is "supplementary
law only" to state rules such as deceptive trade practices laws).
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Two other recent examples suggest agency insensitivity: First, the
Department of Transportation, in issuing regulations on school bus
safety that would preempt state rules, concluded that the regulations
would have no substantial direct effects on states or the relationship
between the states and the federal government. "The reason is that
this final rule applies to manufacturers of school buses and to school
buses, and not to the States or local governments."194 Neither agency
writers of rules nor reviewers at OMB seemed sensitive to the fact that
the rule preempted state authority to regulate.
Further, the Coast Guard issued a well-publicized navigational
safety regulation intended to conform its rules to the International
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea and to reflect current
technology. 95 Along with other Coast Guard regulations, that
regulation's preempting of numerous more stringent Washington State
regulations was challenged by both Washington State and private
tanker owners. Washington State wished to preserve its regulations to
protect the quality of its large inland sea, Puget Sound. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court upheld the federal regulations and their preemptive
effect. 196 Despite the obvious state government interest, the Coast
Guard had concluded in its rulemaking that the rule "does not have
sufficient implications for federalism to warrant the preparation" of a
federalism impact assessment, because "[t]he authority to issue
regulations on [] navigational safety" is "committed to the Coast
Guard by Federal statute."' 97
In short, while it is a small sample, the quality of the reported
assessments suggests that agency rulemaking staff is not especially
sensitive to the sorts of concerns that have motivated federalism
advocates.'95 This conclusion is empirical, of course. Agencies
conceivably could still someday develop expertise in the core values
underlying state autonomy. For example, agencies could be directed to
hire regulators whose training includes strong backgrounds in
governmental structure. In this regard, however, it is worth noting that
194. See Dep't of Transp., Fed. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; School Bus Body Joint
Strength, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,751, 11,753 (Mar. 6, 2000).
195. See Incorporation of Amendments to the International Convention for Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,767, 24,771 (May 10, 1995) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. pts.
50, 52, 56, 58, 61 & 111).
196. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), modifying Intertanko v. Locke, 148
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
197. Incorporation of Amendments to the International Convention for Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,771.
198. In addition to the argument regarding agency expertise, the data also might support
an argument that agency decisionmaking simply is not adequately deliberative in nature. Cf.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 161 (arguing that Chevron deference might not be warranted
for new agency interpretation if "the agency does not seriously consider the variety of
interests at stake in the policy it adopts").
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the General Accounting Office reports of apparent administrative
failure to consider federalism issues in federalism impact analyses
followed multiple presidential orders to agencies to do so. Further,
the federalism impact assessments from 2003 were all prepared
following relatively recent congressional oversight as well, undertaken
when Congress was considering the proposed Federalism
Accountability Act.'
Why agencies have nonetheless not developed expertise in this
area is mysterious. Agency lack of expertise might be explained by
lack of resources. Training employees in implementing the agency's
national programs may be sufficient to exhaust agency resources. Or
perhaps agencies are attending to expressed state concerns, as
required by the federalism executive order, but states and state
associations are not greatly concerned by the "federalism benefits" on
which scholars have focused.' ° Perhaps scholars that emphasize states,
for example, as "laboratories" of experimentation are focusing on the
wrong values, and the core federalism value - which agencies are
honoring - is simply ensuring that states have an opportunity to
be heard."0 '
Alternatively, perhaps the agencies perceive a very low probability
of cost or penalty for not fully considering federalism issues. Perhaps
the agencies did not expect the congressional oversight, mentioned
above, to result in the passage of binding legislation and had little
incentive otherwise to conform their behavior to congressional desires.
Perhaps the Office of Management and Budget, entrusted to review
proposed and final agency rules prior to publication, has not been
particularly interested in compelling agencies to perform more in-
depth assessments of state and local concerns, as suggested by the
executive orders.2" And, of course, those executive orders give rise to
no rights enforceable in court. The precise reasons are unclear. The
199. See supra note 5 (discussing Federalism Accountability Act).
200. If this is the reason, then additional demands to attend to state interests might have
little effect on the content of agency analyses. Similarly, states would be unlikely to demand
extensive congressional oversight of seemingly inadequate agency analyses. To the extent we
wish to commit as a nation to supporting federalism values, this might suggest that we should
not rely on political safeguards alone.
201. Admittedly, the agency focus would then seem inconsistent with the "fundamental
federalism principles" endorsed by the federalism executive order, which include the ideas
that states can function as "laboratories of democracy," can experiment with policy
approaches, and can vary their policies to serve local needs. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2,
64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) ("Fundamental Federalism Principles").
202. The lack of federalism impact assessments that are better than perfunctory does
appear to undermine arguments that agencies are politically accountable for considering the
interests of states. If agencies were fully responsive to state interests, one might expect to see
evidence of that, if not in regulatory outcomes, at least in executive-order-mandated
regulatory deliberative processes. But see supra note 87 and accompanying text (suggesting
that Congress also does not give substantial and systematic consideration to state interests).
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lack of agency attention to more abstract federalism concerns,
however, even after agency consultation with states and congressional
and presidential oversight does suggest the presence of some
persistent institutional obstacles to the development of expertise.
203
By comparison, the institutional competence of both Congress and
the judiciary with respect to more abstract federalism benefits seems
superior to that of agencies. As Sunstein and Vermeule argue, for
example, Congress possesses expertise on large-scale interpretive
issues. °4 Several standing committees in the House and Senate have
jurisdiction that relates to the division of authority between state
governments and the federal government, as well as federalism
issues.0 5 Several congressional hearings have been held on federalism
and states' rights.2' Debates following the Supreme Court's Garcia
decision "showed that many members of Congress were responsive to
arguments based on concepts of federalism [including] local autonomy
[and] the fundamental role of the states. 27
Similarly, judges appear to have a strong claim to institutional
expertise in questions involving the overall distribution of
governmental power, based both on training and tradition. Federal
203. Using detailed statutory requirements, Congress could, of course, require agencies
to properly consider the federalism benefits discussed supra text accompanying notes 75-78
in preempting state law, and make that requirement judicially enforceable. In that case,
either states or other entities that would benefit from more federalism-respecting agency
rules could take an agency to court. The reduction of statutory ambiguity and increase in
judicial oversight of this type, however, would amount to a regime very similar to the one I
advocate in Section III.E - one with optional judicial deference to agency conclusions.
204. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, A Reply to Posner, 101 MICH. L. REV.
972, 976 (2003) (arguing that legislators are also well qualified to decide interpretive
questions and possess "better information about real-world consequences than judges").
205. See, e.g., STANDING RULES OF THE SEN. R. 25(k)(1), 106th Cong. (2000)
(describing jurisdiction of Committee on Governmental Affairs), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt; Comm. on Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Jurisdiction: Committee on Governmental Affairs Full Committee and
Subcommittee Jurisdictions for the 108th Congress, at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/index.cfm?
Fuseaction=About.Jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (describing jurisdiction as
including "intergovernmental relations"); Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, About the Committee, at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/about.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004) (noting that because of the nature of issues facing the committee,
including constitutional issues, members generally have legal background); Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Committee Information: Legislative Jurisdiction, at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/jurisdiction.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (describing jurisdiction as including
constitutional issues and state and territorial boundary lines).
206. See, e.g., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (hearing on Supreme
Court states' rights decisions featuring testimony by Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., about his
book NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES
(2002)); Senate Hearings on Federalism, supra note 15, at 59-97 (testimony given May 6th,
1999, on "Federalism and Crime Control"); Federalism: Hearing Before the House
Committee on the Budget, 104th Cong. (1996); see also supra note 5 (describing Federalism
Accountability Act's consideration by Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).
207. See Lee, supra note 87, at 337.
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judges are generally, if not always, attorneys, and upon appointment,
usually receive training in legal theory, constitutional law, and other
abstract issues that would tend to equip them to consider abstract
issues such as the benefits of federalism.2°
Further, by tradition, as Posner has argued, the involvement of
judges in the " 'political history of the United States,' " not to mention
their experience in assessing the overall distribution of governmental
authority in countless opinions, gives them an institutional advantage
in addressing such questions.' 9 As discussed above, some scholars may
view the courts as having gone astray in attaching great importance to
state sovereignty.210 Nonetheless, agencies would seem no more expert
in assessing these questions.
Again, let us assume that we want the more general federalism
benefits to be considered in deciding preemption questions. A
Chevron deference regime seems to raise a real risk that in many
cases, agencies will fail to meaningfully consider them at all. That
could be for the reasons discussed above21 or simply because agencies
generally tend to be focused on the specific, contextual features of a
problem as they decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether state law
should be preempted.
This is not to say that agencies have no relevant expertise
whatsoever. Whether a particular state law should be preempted may
raise not only federalism-type questions, such as the potential cost to
state autonomy, but very practical questions of the extent of potential
interference with a federal statutory goal. For example, a claim of
obstacle preemption requires a court to decide whether state law
stands as an obstacle to congressional goals. As to these generally
more technical and practical questions, we might reasonably suppose
agencies to possess significant expertise, superior to that of judges.
Further, even if the more general questions of federalism values
were critical in many cases of potential state law preemption, they
208. See generally Wendy K. Tam Cho & Albert H. Yoon, Strange Bedfellows: Politics,
Courts, and Statistics: Statistical Expert Testimony in Voting Rights Cases, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 237, 247 (2001) (describing federally-run "baby judge schools"). For one
nongovernmental example, the Institute of Judicial Administration ran a training session for
new appellate judges in July 2003. See Inst. of Judicial Admin., N.Y.U Sch. of Law,
Appellate Judges Seminar - New Appellate Judges Series, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
institutes/judicial/programs/2003/new.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (describing program).
209. Posner, supra note 173, at 960 n.33 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic
Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW,
AND CULTURE 235, 244 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998)); see ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 164
("Figuring out statutory purpose -and harmonizing applications of statutes with legal and
constitutional principles are the traditional strengths of judges, who are statutory
generalists....").
210. See Caminker, supra note 1; Cross, supra note 75; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 75.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 200-203 (discussing potential reasons for agency
failures to consider federalism values in federalism impact analyses).
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might not be so in all cases. We might think, for example, that some
substantive areas are more part of the "core" of state regulatory
authority than others. Perhaps education regulation is part of core
state regulatory authority, but not so with regulation of
representations made to federal agencies. 2 12 Alternatively, particular
agencies might have varying levels of expertise in considering the
federalism values.
Consequently, we might not conclude that judges always have
superior institutional expertise in the issues implicated by a particular
preemption question. Even so, that does not suggest we should apply
Chevron in the context of preemption. The choice here is not between
sole reliance on agency expertise and sole reliance on judicial
expertise. As discussed in greater detail below, even without Chevron
and with Rice,213 a judge would retain the discretion to take an agency
interpretation into account when the judge found it appropriate under
a doctrine such as Skidmore.214 Judges could take agency expertise into
account in deciding whether an agency interpretation possessed the
"power to persuade. 21 5 Agencies thus could still apply their
" 'specialized experience and broader investigations and
information' " on the practical consequences of dual state and federal
regulation (or preemption) for regulated entities and the achievement
of the specific federal statutory goals.216 The remaining risk would be
that a judge might inappropriately refuse to defer to an expert agency
interpretation rendered on a preemption question.
This analysis of institutional competence also assumes that
Congress has not explicitly delegated interpretive authority on
questions of state law preemption. Congress may agree that agencies
do not have the institutional advantage in considering federalism
questions. For example, one congressional committee that has recently
deliberated on the issue appears to have concluded that Chevron
deference should yield in favor of a strict presumption against
preemption.217 However, Congress is not precluded from explicitly
delegating interpretive authority on preemption questions to an
agency, subject to whatever constraints the nondelegation principle
212. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)
(refusing to apply presumption against preemption in fraud-on-the-FDA case).
213. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
214. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also infra text accompanying
notes 248-255 (discussing Skidmore approach).
215. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
216. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 139).
217. See supra note 5 (discussing Federalism Accountability Act).
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might impose.218 Congress has occasionally delegated such authority
by statute.219 Any such decision would be made publicly in a
participatory process, so that interested groups and individuals could
lobby Congress, and Congress would bear any resulting political costs
for its decision. 220 To the extent the requirements are statutory and
"directed specifically at agency action," a " 'faithful agency' " would,
of course, have to adhere to them.221
In explicitly delegating preemptive authority, Congress can weigh
for itself arguments regarding institutional competence and whether a
particular delegation might make preemption more or less likely.
222
Congress might believe an agency to possess, or instruct it to develop,
relevant expertise, and would presumably supply appropriate
guidelines or constraints. An authority-delegating statute could
require the agency to consider, say, the value of state autonomy, if
Congress thought that appropriate. 223  Alternatively, an explicit
delegation of interpretive authority to an agency along with a national
218. Sunstein has argued that Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong might constrain a
congressional delegation of interpretive authority clearly beyond agency expertise, see infra
note 232 (discussing Mow Sun Wong), although he acknowledges that the prospect is "most
unlikely" except if a "constitutional right is plausibly at stake." Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, supra note 14, at 337.
219. For example, Congress provided for federal surface mining program rules to be
preempted "insofar as they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the
requirements of this chapter and the Federal program," and authorized the Secretary of
Interior to "set forth any State law or regulation which is preempted and superseded by the
Federal program." 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (2000). In this case, Congress's primary goal was
achieving national programmatic purposes; this provision seems fairly read as authorizing
the Secretary to preempt state law despite possible state interests in autonomy. See also 49
U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2000) (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to determine whether
hazardous materials transportation statute preempts particular state, local, or tribal
requirements); id. § 31,141(c)(4) (providing Secretary of Transportation with three criteria
to consider in deciding whether state law or regulation is preempted).
Congress also has occasionally provided special procedures governing agency
interpretations that preempt state laws. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 43 (2000) (requiring special
notice-and-comment procedures for interpretations rendered by federal banking agencies).
220. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 332.
221. See Mashaw, supra note 178, at 6.
222. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14, at 339 ("But a requirement
that Congress make the decision on its own is certainly likely to make abuses less common, if
they are legitimately characterized as abuses at all.").
223. As some have argued, of course, an increase in the number of criteria an agency
must consider may have the paradoxical effect of increasing the agency's discretion,
especially if the criteria point in different directions. One example of this phenomenon is
found in the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000), which
authorizes national forests to be managed for any of a long ist of potential uses, some of
which conflict with one another. As a consequence, the Forest Service has considerable
discretion in prioritizing uses. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing:
Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557,
620-21 (2003) (discussing discretion resulting from inclusive NFMA language).
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program to implement might be understood as Congress devaluing
federalism values compared with the program's goals.224
In the absence of an express congressional delegation, however,
the evidence suggests that courts should make no across-the-board
assumption, as implicit in Chevron, of .agency expertise to consider
these types of state interests.
C. The Risk of Arbitrary Decisionmaking and Tension with the "Rule
of Law ,225
Federalism values of preserving state autonomy and core
regulatory functions also generally will be beyond the statutory
criteria an agency is to apply.226 Ensuring that an agency functions
under the "rule of law" is a key aspect of holding it legally accountable
and ensuring that its authority is exercised in a nonarbitrary manner.227
This requires the agency to operate "within identifiable and deter-
minate bounds. ', 21 Otherwise, agency decisionmakers would be freer
to serve narrow private interests or their own ideological views.229
224. To the extent one rejects the argument that political safeguards are adequate to
protect federalism values, one might, of course, argue at this point that judicial intervention
is necessary. See supra text accompanying notes 103-120 (discussing debate over "political
safeguards").
225. Strauss, supra note 131, at 322 (quoting Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers
and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees," 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 376
(1989)).
226. Again, this analysis assumes no explicit congressional delegation of authority to
preempt.
227. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 133 (4th ed. 2002)
("The dominant concern of administrative law is the legal control of administration.");
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1284 (1984) (observing that various models of administrative agencies are aimed at saying
bureaucracies are " 'under control' "); Strauss, supra note 131, at 334 (noting that
pragmatists define operation under "rule of law" with reference to "constraining character
of [the] tradition or context within which judgments are made"). See generally Bressman,
supra note 132; Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1742
(2002) (describing hallmarks of "juridical democracy" as "specificity, adherence to formal
decisionmaking procedures, explicit consideration of the implications of legislation for larger
principles of justice, and limited delegation"); Mendelson, supra note 223, at 577-78.
228. Bressman, supra note 132, at 470.
229. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 129, at 530; Mashaw, supra note 178, at 6 (arguing
that agencies are created to carry out "special purpose missions"). For a few examples of
agency creation to serve focused missions, see Message of the President Transmitting Reorg.
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C.A. app. 1 (West 1996) (creating EPA, stating that the "principal
roles and functions of the EPA would include [t]he establishment and enforcement of
protection standards consistent with national environmental goals," research, and assisting
others through grants in arresting pollution, and stating that EPA will "focus on setting and
enforcing pollution control standards"); 15 U.S.C. § 653 (2000) (creating Office of Rural
Affairs of Small Business Administration and designating its purposes as focusing upon
economic opportunities available in rural areas); 42 U.S.C. § 901 (2000) (creating Social
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The concern with ensuring adequately bounded agency decisions
also is central to the Administrative Procedure Act, which, of course,
provides that an agency decision may be vacated by a court if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. ''13° As the courts have explicated, determining
whether an agency decision is appropriately bounded requires
identifying the relevant factors that an agency must apply in rendering
its decision and then assuring that the agency has assessed those
factors. 1 Identification of the relevant criteria helps assure not only
that agency discretion is bounded, but that agencies can be held
accountable for their exercise of authority and checked by outside
institutions, such as courts.
For example, in National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v.
Thomas, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA's
increase in pesticide tolerance levels for imported mangoes. EPA had
reasoned that a lower tolerance level would harm the economies of
less-developed mango-exporting nations. The D.C. Circuit invalidated
the decision, noting that the statute EPA was administering
authorized it to promulgate tolerance levels based on public health
concerns and some other relevant factors, but that protecting the
economic welfare of foreign nations was not among them, and the
factor was simply too far afield for EPA to rely on it.232
Similarly, in Chevron Step Two cases, the courts have assessed the
reasonability of an agency statutory interpretation by considering
whether the agency has relied on factors made relevant under the
Security Administration and defining its duty as "administer[ing] the old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance program ... and the supplemental security income program").
230. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). It is also, of course, a concern of the nondelegation doctrine,
though that doctrine is sufficiently weak to present no bar to delegating even poorly defined
authority to agencies. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75
(2001) (stating that Court has "'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.' ") (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
231. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(holding that an agency must apply relevant factors in rendering its decision and avoid
applying irrelevant factors).
232. Nat'l Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Similar concerns appeared to animate the Supreme Court's decision in Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), where, despite the government's offer of a variety of
justifications, the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, a Civil Service Commission
regulation requiring that most federal civil service jobs be filled by citizens. The Court
invalidated the regulation in part because it was "not willing to presume that the Chairman
of the Civil Services Commission ... was deliberately fostering an interest [such as providing
an expendable token for treaty negotiating purposes or an incentive for aliens to become
naturalized] so far removed from his normal responsibilities." Id. at 105; see also Garrett,
supra note 77, at 1175 (discussing Mow Sun Wong and arguing that the Court was concerned
that decision be made by entity "that could legitimately consider all the factors that might be
relevant to the decision").
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statute. For example, in Verizon Communications v. FCC, the
Supreme Court upheld as reasonable an FCC rule requiring
incumbent telephone carriers to combine elements of their networks
at the request of entering companies who cannot themselves combine
the elements.33 The Court found the rule to be reasonable after
concluding that the FCC had appropriately considered the statutory
goal of removing practical barriers to competitive entry into local
telephone markets. Finally, the Supreme Court has recently suggested
in Whitman v. American Trucking that agency consideration of
compliance costs, where the statute did not mention cost, would be
grounds for vacating the agency decision altogether because "the
administrator had not followed the law."2
An agency's reliance on federalism concerns apparently
uncontemplated by the statutory scheme thus could present legal
problems. If a court were to find that federalism values such as
preserving a state's core regulatory functions were irrelevant under
the agency's authorizing federal statute, the court might be compelled
to invalidate an agency's interpretation of the statute's preemptive
effect as arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law under the
Administrative Procedure Act (or unreasonable under Chevron Step
Two).
Whether or not the agency's decision would pass legal muster
under the APA, this issue signals a more serious theoretical problem
with deference to agencies on preemption issues. Agencies necessarily
retain some flexibility in applying their statutory criteria. When an
agency is to consider the "cost" of a rule, for example, considering
overall social cost, cost to regulated entities, or cost to the government
all seem fair game. Further, agencies often must confront questions of
value in administering statutes. For example, as Sunstein and
Vermeule suggest, when a statute calls upon the agency to regulate
food additives that "cause cancer," the agency must make
determinations of value in deciding which substances are carcinogenic
enough to be deemed to cause cancer within the meaning of the
statute.235
Generally, however, those values have a fairly direct connection to
statutory purposes; they are not simply pulled out of the air or out of
some set of concerns external to the statute. That is not the case for
233. Verizon, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 534-38 (2002); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86-87 (2002) (upholding EEOC regulation permitting employer not
to hire disabled individual following particularized inquiry into prospect that worker would
suffer significant health injury in workplace).
234. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 471 n.4.
235. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 885.
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many issues implicated by preemption questions.236 Federalism issues
are not only typically distant from the statute an agency is entrusted to
administer, but also are an especially broad-ranging and poorly
defined set.
For example, suppose an agency is considering whether Congress
meant to "preempt the field" in enacting a particular statute. If acting
as a court normally would, an agency engaging in such an inquiry
might have to consider the relative breadth or depth of federal
regulation, and consequently where a particular federal regulatory
regime fits, relative to state regulation, in the "whole of the legal
order. 237 Similarly, suppose an agency were to assess whether a state
law was an "obstacle" to federal purposes. In both inquiries, the
agency might attach value to a variety of functions served by state role
and autonomy.
Assuming, again, that we wish preemption decisions to incorporate
these sorts of considerations, permitting an agency to be the primary
decisionmaker would encourage an administrative decisionmaking
process that is inadequately bounded. This is an especial problem
where Congress has not explicitly spoken to state regulatory role;
Congress is unlikely to have specified or even hinted at what issues an
agency should consider in evaluating a statute's preemptive scope. An
agency could pick and choose considerations far outside those
reasonably suggested by the statute it is expounding. Because courts
would lack ascertainable standards against which to measure agency
conduct, such an approach would make adequate judicial review of the
agency's decision very difficult. Courts might have a difficult time
distinguishing legitimate agency interpretations from those that
represent abuse of the agency's authority - or might be tempted to
insert their own values in making that distinction. Similarly,
congressional oversight would be more difficult.
It may be that having agencies interpret a statute with reference to
interference with core state regulatory functions is beyond agency
authority. Even if it is not, judicial deference to such agency
interpretations appears inconsistent with the goal of holding agencies
legally accountable for the authority they exercise.23
D. Agency Self-Interest
Finally, the prospect of agency bias weakly weighs against the
application of Chevron deference. While an agency would not directly
236. Cf. Bermann, supra note 87, at 93 (noting that federalism executive orders are
limited in that "they cannot override any clear mandate to the agencies coming from
Congress").
237. E.g., Dinh, supra note 1; Mashaw, supra note 178, at 6.
238. Mashaw, supra note 178, at 6.
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expand its own jurisdiction in reading an ambiguous statute to
preempt state law, it could, through a preemption decision, indirectly
lay the groundwork for an increase in the agency's importance by
making itself the primary regulator - as a practical matter, the only
game in town.239 This would enable it to demand a larger budget and
more employees in order to properly regulate the field.240
Alternatively, to the extent one accepts a public choice view of agency
regulation, an agency's power to preempt conflicting state law would
make it better able to deliver on "deals" with well-organized interest
groups. For one example, journalists suggested that an OSHA chief in
the Reagan administration might be responding to industry by arguing
for the preemption of state law by "weaker Federal labeling
regulation. '24' Either self-interest or interest-group capture could
conceivably lead an agency to discount state interests in rendering
preemption decisions.
The focus on agency self-interest as a reason to deny deference to
agency preemption interpretations is linked to the debate over
whether an agency interpretation of its own jurisdiction is entitled to
Chevron deference. In that context, a few Justices have weighed in
against Chevron deference to agency interpretations of their own
jurisdiction,242 consistent with the view that "those limited by law
[should] generally not [be] empowered to decide on the meaning of
the limitation." '243 However, the dominant view is that Chevron
239. Cf Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 35, at 2100.
240. By comparison, the "block-granting" of a variety of programs, including welfare, to
the states, justified sharply reducing the size of the federal bureaucracy in these areas. See
also David Hoffman, Reagan Continues Shift of Priorities; News Analysis, WASH. POST, Feb.
6, 1986, at Al (noting Presidential budget proposal to " 'get out of the business of... local
sewage treatment systems, local airports, local law enforcement' " and its motivation by
"deficit targets in the balanced-budget law Congress passed last year").
241. See, e.g., Ben A. Franklin, OSHA Regulatory Changes: Departing Chief Proud, but
Criticism Persists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1984, at B16 (discussing criticisms of OSHA chief
Thome G. Auchter as unduly responsive to industry and inadequately protective of industry
workers and noting his "insistence that.., weaker Federal labeling regulation must pre-
empt [stronger] state laws [already in force]"). In litigation, private litigants have similarly
sought preemption because they wish to preserve financial advantages gained in the federal
administrative process. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 376 (1986)
("What is really troubling respondents [AT&T and others arguing that FCC orders
respecting telephone plant and equipment depreciation preempt state rules], of course, is
their sense that state regulators will not allow them sufficient revenues.").
242. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 387 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) ("[Tlhis Court has never
deferred to an agency's interpretation of a statute designed to confine the scope of its
jurisdiction.").
243. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 35, at 2097; see also Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 374-75 ("To permit an agency to expand its power [by preempting
state law] in the face of a congressional limitation on its jurisdiction would be to grant to the
agency power to override Congress. This we are both unwilling and unable to do."); Eric
Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
N.R.D.C., 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986 (1987); Quincy Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference
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deference is generally appropriate, largely because there is no
"discernible line" between an agency's interpretation of its own
authority under a statute and an agency's interpretation of what
statutory applications are authorized.2"
Implicitly, Justices and scholars appear to have concluded that
withdrawing Chevron deference from jurisdiction-related
interpretations might create two overly high costs. First, a court might
erroneously identify a run-of-the-mill interpretive question as a
jurisdiction-related question not deserving of deference. Second, such
a rule would introduce great uncertainty to the legislative process, as
Congress could no longer be sure whether its language, if ambiguous,
would be interpreted by an agency or by a judge.
By comparison, denying deference to agency interpretations on
state law preemption issues because of self-interest does not seem to
impose the same sorts of costs. Preemption questions are relatively
easy to distinguish, ex ante, from other categories of interpretive
questions, so withdrawing deference on preemption issues would not
introduce significant new uncertainty-based costs into the legislative
process. Similarly, the risk of erroneously confusing some other sort of
interpretive question with a preemption question seems relatively low.
Empirical questions of course remain. For example, how often is
an agency's decision on whether a statute preempts state law really
likely to be tainted by the agency's desire to expand its regulatory
turf? As some have noted, rather than seeking to expand their powers,
agencies have often interpreted statutes to limit the bureaucratic
workload.245 Alternatively, an agency might interpret a statute in a
purely public interested way, without regard for the scope of its own
responsibility following the interpretation.2" Nonetheless, agency
decisions on state law preemption questions present at least some risk
of an agency power grab. That risk seems increased to the extent one
to Agency Interpretations That Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 957, 969-70 (1994).
244. See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(explicitly deciding in favor of deference and arguing that Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
have, as a practical matter, deferred to agency determinations of jurisdiction); see also Dole
v. United States, 494 U.S. 26, 53-54 (1990) (White, J., dissenting); Mississippi Power & Light
Co., 487 U.S. at 380 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Crawford, supra note 243, at 968-83
(arguing in favor of deference); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2153-54 (2002) ("But the problem with that claim is that
every statutory interpretation implicates the scope of agency jurisdiction by defining what
comes within the statutes over which the agency has uncontested jurisdiction."); Hasen,
supra note 25, at 336 n.47 (citing appellate cases pointing in different directions on deference
issue).
245. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 243, at 982 (citing cases in which agency acted to
"restrict the scope of its authority").
246. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7
(2000).
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accepts Hills's position that anti-preemption forces are less well
organized than pro-preemption forces, since an incorrect agency
decision finding preemption presumably would be both easier for pro-
preemption groups to procure and more difficult to reverse.247
E. A Regime Without Chevron Deference
Without Chevron deference, a court could apply the Rice
presumption against preemption in deciding whether a statute
preempted state law, even if an administrative agency had attempted
to address the preemption question. This is not to say, however, that a
court would afford an administrative agency interpretation no
deference whatsoever. Even under Rice, the court could continue to
follow the agency interpretation on a case-by-case basis to the extent
the court finds the agency interpretation persuasive under the doctrine
of Skidmore v. Swift.2" Under Skidmore, a court evaluating an agency
interpretation could examine the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."249
For example, an agency interpretation may be based in part on
judgments about specific, contextual policy issues, the details of a
statutory scheme's implementation, or the response of regulated
entities to particular policies. For such issues, agencies may have
expertise superior to that of judges. Consider whether California
should be permitted to ban a particular fuel additive that has
contaminated its groundwater, despite a federal statutory scheme
aimed at air quality that contemplates the use of such additives to
reduce motor vehicle emissions. The preemption issue may raise not
only questions of state autonomy (and statutory authority), but the
question whether the state law interferes with the achievement of
federal environmental protection goals. The agency might consider
other environmental impacts and the availability of alternative
additives." Further, a court could consider an agency assessment of
247. See supra text accompanying notes 114-116 (discussing HILLS, supra note 52).
248. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
249. Id. at 140. Ronald Levin argues that as a practical matter, Skidmore-like
considerations are buried beneath the surface of the Chevron Step One analysis of whether
Congress's intent is "clear." E.g., Levin, supra note 34, at 779-80 ("[S]tep one deference....
evidently rests upon prudential considerations that are akin to, if not identical to, the policies
underlying Skidmore."). If this position is accepted, there would be little practical difference
between Chevron and Skidmore (and little need to "reconcile" Chevron with Rice).
However, if one accepts Chevron at face value, then having judges expressly apply Skidmore
in preference to Chevron seems at least a more candid exercise of judicial authority.
250. The Ninth Circuit handled a similar question and found no preemption in
Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2003), but without the benefit of an
agency interpretation.
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effects upon the core regulatory functions and sovereignty of states, to
the extent the analysis has the "power to persuade." '251
A couple of concerns might be raised about withdrawing Chevron
deference on preemption questions and replacing it with judicial
discretion to defer under Skidmore.252 First, Congress might, in theory,
face greater uncertainty in anticipating who will interpret an
ambiguous statutory provision. However, because preemption issues
are relatively easy to identify ex ante,253 the increase in uncertainty and
decision costs from reserving judicial authority over these issues is
likely to be small. (This concern might be more significant for other
issues more difficult to identify.) Further, as one scholar has argued
more generally, these sorts of costs may pale in comparison to the
difficulty of predicting whether a particular interpretive question will
be resolved under Chevron Step One or Chevron Step Two.5 4
Second, a judge might inappropriately decline to defer to an
agency's interpretation. The judge might do so even if the agency's
expertise and political accountability on the particular preemption
question are superior to that of the judge. However, judges regularly
defer to agency interpretations under Skidmore.55 Further, assuming
that we wish preemption decisions generally to take into account
federalism concerns of the type discussed above, the risk of error of
this type seems less significant than potential problems created by
affording Chevron deference across the board to agency preemption
interpretations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The answer to whether Chevron should yield to the presumption
against preemption depends in part on empirical questions that this
paper cannot conclusively resolve, including the extent to which state
interests are truly considered in either the congressional or
251. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
252. Another, less significant concern might be that refusing Chevron deference could
raise the cost of agency operations. Agencies might expend more on rendering an
interpretation in anticipation of a more searching judicial review, for example, even if those
added resources and analysis do not ultimately affect the decision. However, even without
Chevron deference, an agency could still present an interpretation to a court and expect it to
receive some weight under the Skidmore doctrine, depending on the interpretation's
thoroughness, consistency, validity of reasoning, and other factors giving it "power to
persuade." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000).
253. See supra text accompanying note 245.
254. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 14.
255. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921,
974 n.241, 999 (1998) (describing cases of Skidmore deference even prior to Supreme Court's
2000 reaffirmation of doctrine in Christensen).
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administrative process, the extent to which agencies could develop
expertise in questions of overall governmental structure, and the
extent to which an agency decision may be biased by an agency desire
to increase its own authority.
Nonetheless, the analysis suggests several factors that, taken
together, weigh against Chevron deference to administrative
interpretations of state law preemption. Contrary to the analysis of
some other scholars, political accountability is not a significant factor
weighing against deference. Especially when the interests of a state are
at stake, congressional representation does not seem to have
substantial advantages over the agency process.
However, even if agencies have greater political accountability and
a greater incentive to consider state interests than they typically are
credited with, they also generally lack expertise in questions of the
overall balance of government authority. Assuming we view these
sorts of questions as intrinsic to a preemption determination, the
expertise factor weighs strongly against Chevron deference. Further,
from an administrative process standpoint, encouraging agencies to
consider nonstatutory factors at will in rendering an interpretation
may undermine the legal accountability of agencies. Finally, because
preemption issues are relatively easy to identify ex ante as a class,
withdrawing across-the-board deference should not significantly raise
decision costs for Congress.
More closely analyzing whether Chevron deference should apply in
preemption cases has implications for other administrative law
problems as well. First, the analysis suggests some limits to Chevron
itself. Chevron is predicated on presuming that Congress would have
wanted agencies, rather than courts, to retain primary interpretive
authority over statutes agencies administer, based on superior political
accountability and institutional competence. What an assessment of
preemption-related interpretations suggests, however, is that while we
might properly presume that an agency generally possesses
institutional competence in administering its statutory programs, there
are limits. One such limit may be with respect to broad questions of
the distribution of governmental authority.
Moreover, analysis of preemption suggests a more general
framework for resolving the conflict between value-based canons and
Chevron. An approach where a court reconciles canons with Chevron
by withdrawing at will matters the court deems "important" from the
Chevron framework fails to respect the concerns underlying that
doctrine. An approach more faithful to Chevron should address not
only the .political accountability of agencies, but their legal
accountability and their expertise on the issues at hand, as well as the
possible decision costs that might be faced by agencies and Congress
under a particular approach.
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Ultimately, the source of the tension between Chevron and the
presumption against preemption is that Congress has failed to define
explicitly whether it believes a statute preempts state law or whether it
wishes an administrative agency to decide that question. An agency
could seek explicit interpretive authority from Congress, which
Congress has sometimes granted 6.2 " The agency's efforts might be
assisted by the well-organized interest groups that often seek uniform
national standards. 7 Congress could also provide the agency with
guidance for determining when a state law is preempted. Such a
delegation of preemptive authority might address a number of the
issues discussed above. It might represent Congress's considered
judgment that the agency already possesses or should develop the
expertise to balance programmatic issues against state interests in
autonomy and self-regulation. It might also represent a judgment that
Congress does not wish an agency to consider state interests at all
while carrying out programmatic goals.258 In the meantime, however,
when a statute is ambiguous, a court should be free to apply the Rice
presumption against preemption, as well as to exercise its discretion to
take an agency interpretation into account when the court deems it
appropriate, based on a factor such as agency expertise. In short, a
court should exercise its own judgment to resolve questions of state
law preemption, even when an agency has issued an interpretation.
256. See supra note 219 (listing explicit statutory delegations of interpretive authority).
257. See HILLS, supra note 52.
258. See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 926 ("It is generally agreed that
courts must follow congressional instructions on the question of deference ... to agency
interpretations of law .... ).
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